Tuesday, August 24, 2010

Graft Dispute in Afghanistan is Test for U.S.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/24/world/asia/24karzai.html?_r=1&th&emc=th

 

 

The New York Times

August 23, 2010

Graft Dispute in Afghanistan is Test for U.S.

By ROD NORDLAND and MARK MAZZETTI

KABUL, Afghanistan — As corruption investigations begin to focus on President Hamid Karzai’s inner circle, an Afghan official on Monday pinned blame for endemic corruption in Afghanistan on foreign contractors, which he said had created an “economic mafia” in the war-torn country.

What started as the arrest of a little-known Karzai aide has become a significant test of the Obama administration’s efforts to root out corruption in Afghanistan, even as it tries not to alienate the Karzai government. The two goals are coming into conflict at a time when American popular support for the war is eroding and frustration in Congress about the Karzai government is rising.

The investigations that led to the arrest last month of the aide, Mohammed Zia Saleh, a member of Afghanistan’s National Security Council, are being carried out by Afghan investigators who are strongly backed by the United States. Mr. Karzai admitted Sunday that he had personally intervened to secure the release of the aide and said he would impose new rules governing the investigators.

Some United States officials and outside experts warned that the escalating tensions between Washington and Kabul could undermine the overall American strategy in Afghanistan, aimed at combating Taliban militias and strengthening government institutions before a planned American military withdrawal beginning next summer.

“The administration is engaged in a delicate balancing act in Afghanistan in which the principal objective is stability,” said David Rothkopf, a former Clinton administration official and national security specialist. “There are a couple of things they need for stability: one is government institutions that people trust and don’t want to overthrow. And the other is government institutions that are strong enough politically to survive.

“And the calculation here is that you need Karzai for the latter and you need anticorruption for the former. The problem is that Karzai is too associated with corruption,” Mr. Rothkopf said, “so if the anticorruption efforts are too vigorous, they will lead to undermining this ally.”

At a news conference on Monday, Waheed Omar, Mr. Karzai’s spokesman, elaborated on criticisms made by the Afghan president during an interview with ABC News on Sunday, and blamed foreign contractors spending Western reconstruction money for much of Afghanistan’s corruption. He said that the new government rules would rein in the two American-backed anticorruption agencies, the Major Crimes Task Force and the Sensitive Investigative Unit.

By the end of the day, however, the presidential palace had not issued the decree.

Officials in the United States government said they were not sure what to make of the statements by Mr. Karzai and the spokesman.

“It’s perfectly understandable that as these new tools develop, the Afghan government needs to ensure that they are functioning under the rule of law and the Afghan Constitution,” said P. J. Crowley, a State Department spokesman. “But going forward, these entities must be able to open investigations and aggressively pursue facts wherever they may lead without looking over their shoulders.”

The Obama administration has made fighting corruption in Afghanistan a mainstay of its policy here, and the two new agencies have been particularly successful in apprehending corruption suspects, with at least 52 people now in custody on graft and drug trafficking charges.

Despite widespread allegations of corruption involving President Karzai’s relatives, including his half brother Ahmed Wali Karzai, investigators have not taken action against any family members. The perception that Mr. Karzai intended to scuttle the two agencies has caused one of the most serious crises in American-Afghan relations since last year’s presidential elections, which international observers denounced as fraudulent.

The two anticorruption agencies have broad powers to arrest, detain and try suspects, and both have large components of American advisers.

“There will be no political interference, but we don’t want anyone taken out of their homes with chains and shackles,” Mr. Omar said, describing Mr. Karzai’s promised new rules. The rules, he said, would ensure that “neither Afghanistan’s government nor the international community will interfere in their work, which will be based on Afghanistan’s Constitution and judicial sovereignty.”

Some law enforcement officials suggested that Afghan officials may simply be unfamiliar with routine law-enforcement techniques now being used by the elite anticorruption units.

The current turbulence traces back to the spring of 2009, when the United States Justice Department began several major initiatives to help build up the Afghan government’s anticorruption and counternarcotics law enforcement efforts, as well as an independent judiciary. To protect them from political interference, the two anticorruption task forces have their own lawyers, investigators and judges.

In an interview on Monday, Drug Enforcement Administration officials praised the growing capabilities of the Sensitive Investigative Unit, which consists of several dozen Afghan police officers overseen by an Afghan police colonel.

The D.E.A. vetted the officers and brought them to Quantico, Va., for a six-week training course. Veteran D.E.A. agents, serving as advisers, work together with them in Afghanistan.

“We don’t just train them and then never see them again,” said Frankie Shroyer, the deputy chief of operations for the D.E.A. Still, the degree of involvement by United States officials in the work of the Afghan units is a matter of acute diplomatic sensitivity. D.E.A. officials emphasized that the relationship is a partnership with the Afghan government, and that Afghan officials direct all counternarcotics police activities.

“Everything is done in conjunction with Afghan counterparts,” said Thomas M. Harrigan, the D.E.A.’s chief of operations.

Some American officials acknowledged the administration’s concern about Mr. Karzai’s seeming defiance of anticorruption inquiries, but also the limits to what the United States can do.

Earlier this year, Obama administration officials adopted a new strategy in dealing with the Karzai government. Instead of continuing to regularly criticize the Afghan government for failing to root out corruption, the administration decided to back off and publicly praise Mr. Karzai and his aides.

Still, some experts said that the previous “tough love” strategy had fostered paranoia inside the presidential palace in Kabul, leading Mr. Karzai to conclude the United States was trying to push him out. “We had a year and a half making Karzai convinced that he has to tighten ties with these corrupt people in order to survive,” said Ronald E. Neumann, the American ambassador to Kabul from 2005 to 2007.

Mr. Neumann said that the July 2011 date for the beginning of a military withdrawal from Afghanistan has only reinforced Mr. Karzai’s belief that he must cut deals with unsavory but powerful figures to remain in charge after the Americans leave.

“You can’t ignore the corruption, but you can’t ignore the fact that Karzai sees some of it as vital to his survival,” he said.

Rod Nordland reported from Kabul, and Mark Mazzetti from Washington. Charlie Savage and Helene Cooper contributed reporting from Washington.

Copyright 2010 The New York Times Company

 

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