Published on Portside (https://portside.org)
The 1930's
Were Humanity's Darkest, Bloodiest Hour
Jonathan Freedland
Saturday, March 11, 2017
The Guardian
Even to
mention the 1930s is to evoke the period when human civilisation entered its
darkest, bloodiest chapter. No case needs to be argued; just to name the decade
is enough. It is a byword for mass poverty, violent extremism and the gathering
storm of world war. “The 1930s” is not so much a label for a period of time
than it is rhetorical shorthand – a two-word warning from history.
Witness the
impact of an otherwise boilerplate broadcast by the Prince of Wales last
December that made headlines: “Prince Charles warns of return to the ‘dark days
of the 1930s’ in Thought for the Day message.” Or consider the reflex response
to reports that Donald Trump was to maintain his own private security force
even once he had reached the White House. The Nobel prize-winning economist
Paul Krugman’s tweet was typical: “That 1930s show returns.”
Because
that decade was scarred by multiple evils, the phrase can be used to conjure up
serial spectres. It has an international meaning, with a vocabulary that
centres on Hitler and Nazism and the failure to resist them: from brownshirts
and Goebbels to appeasement, Munich and Chamberlain. And it has a domestic
meaning, with a lexicon and imagery that refers to the Great Depression: the
dust bowl, soup kitchens, the dole queue and Jarrow. It was this second
association that gave such power to a statement from the usually dry Office for
Budget Responsibility, following then-chancellor George Osborne’s autumn statement
in 2014. The OBR warned that public spending would be at its lowest level since
the 1930s; the political damage was enormous and instant.
In
recent months, the 1930s have been invoked more than ever, not to describe some
faraway menace but to warn of shifts under way in both Europe and the United
States. The surge of populist, nationalist movements in Europe, and their
apparent counterpart in the US, has stirred unhappy memories and has, perhaps
inevitably, had commentators and others reaching for the historical yardstick
to see if today measures up to 80 years ago.
Why is it
the 1930s to which we return, again and again? For some sceptics, the answer is
obvious: it’s the only history anybody knows. According to this jaundiced view
of the British school curriculum, Hitler and Nazis long ago displaced Tudors
and Stuarts as the core, compulsory subjects of the past. When we fumble in the
dark for a historical precedent, our hands keep reaching for the 30s because
they at least come with a little light.
The more
generous explanation centres on the fact that that period, taken together with
the first half of the 1940s, represents a kind of nadir in human affairs. The
Depression was, as Larry Elliott wrote last week, “the biggest setback to the
global economy since the dawn of the modern industrial age”, leaving 34 million
Americans with no income. The hyperinflation experienced in Germany – when a
thief would steal a laundry-basket full of cash, chucking away the money in
order to keep the more valuable basket – is the stuff of legend. And the
Depression paved the way for history’s bloodiest conflict, the second world war
which left, by some estimates, a mind-numbing 60 million people dead. At its
centre was the Holocaust, the industrialised slaughter of 6 million Jews by the
Nazis: an attempt at the annihilation of an entire people.
In these
multiple ways, then, the 1930s function as a historical rock bottom, a
demonstration of how low humanity can descend. The decade’s illustrative power
as a moral ultimate accounts for why it is deployed so fervently and so often.
Less
abstractly, if we keep returning to that period, it’s partly because it can
justifiably claim to be the foundation stone of our modern world. The
international and economic architecture that still stands today – even if it
currently looks shaky and threatened – was built in reaction to the havoc
wreaked in the 30s and immediately afterwards. The United Nations, the European
Union, the International Monetary Fund, Bretton Woods: these were all born of a
resolve not to repeat the mistakes of the 30s, whether those mistakes be
rampant nationalism or beggar-my-neighbour protectionism. The world of 2017 is
shaped by the trauma of the 1930s.
The
international and economic architecture that still stands today was built in
reaction to the havoc of the 1930s
One
telling, human illustration came in recent global polling for the Journal of
Democracy, which showed an alarming decline in the number of people who
believed it was “essential” to live in a democracy. From Sweden to the US, from
Britain to Australia, only one in four of those born in the 1980s regarded
democracy as essential. Among those born in the 1930s, the figure was at or
above 75%. Put another way, those who were born into the hurricane have no
desire to feel its wrath again.
Most of
these dynamics are long established, but now there is another element at work.
As the 30s move from living memory into history, as the hurricane moves further
away, so what had once seemed solid and fixed – specifically, the view that
that was an era of great suffering and pain, whose enduring value is as an
eternal warning – becomes contested, even upended.
Witness the
remarks of Steve Bannon, chief strategist in Donald Trump’s White House and the
former chairman of the far-right Breitbart website. In an interview with the
Hollywood Reporter, Bannon promised that the Trump era would be “as exciting as
the 1930s”. (In the same interview, he said “Darkness is good” – citing Satan,
Darth Vader and Dick Cheney as examples.)
“Exciting”
is not how the 1930s are usually remembered, but Bannon did not choose his
words by accident. He is widely credited with the authorship of Trump’s
inaugural address, which twice used the slogan “America first”. That phrase has
long been off-limits in US discourse, because it was the name of the movement –
packed with nativists and antisemites, and personified by the celebrity aviator
Charles Lindbergh – that sought to keep the US out of the war against Nazi
Germany and to make an accommodation with Hitler. Bannon, who considers himself
a student of history, will be fully aware of that 1930s association – but
embraced it anyway.
That makes
him an outlier in the US, but one with powerful allies beyond America’s shores.
Timothy Snyder, professor of history at Yale and the author of On Tyranny:
Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century, notes that European nationalists are
also keen to overturn the previously consensual view of the 30s as a period of
shame, never to be repeated. Snyder mentions Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor
Orbán, who avowedly seeks the creation of an “illiberal” state, and who, says
Snyder, “looks fondly on that period as one of healthy national consciousness”.
The more
arresting example is, perhaps inevitably, Vladimir Putin. Snyder notes Putin’s
energetic rehabilitation of Ivan Ilyin, a philosopher of Russian fascism
influential eight decades ago. Putin has exhumed Ilyin both metaphorically and
literally, digging up and moving his remains from Switzerland to Russia.
Among other
things, Ilyin wrote that individuality was evil; that the “variety of human
beings” represented a failure of God to complete creation; that what mattered
was not individual people but the “living totality” of the nation; that Hitler
and Mussolini were exemplary leaders who were saving Europe by dissolving
democracy; and that fascist holy Russia ought to be governed by a “national
dictator”. Ilyin spent the 30s exiled from the Soviet Union, but Putin has
brought him back, quoting him in his speeches and laying flowers on his grave.
European
nationalists are keen to overturn the view of the 1930s as a period of shame,
never to be repeated
Still,
Putin, Orbán and Bannon apart, when most people compare the current situation
to that of the 1930s, they don’t mean it as a compliment. And the parallel has
felt irresistible, so that when Trump first imposed his travel ban, for
example, the instant comparison was with the door being closed to refugees from
Nazi Germany in the 30s. (Theresa May was on the receiving end of the same
comparison when she quietly closed off the Dubs route to child refugees from
Syria.)
When Trump
attacked the media as purveyors of “fake news”, the ready parallel was Hitler’s
slamming of the newspapers as the Lügenpresse, the lying press (a term used by
today’s German far right). When the Daily Mail branded a panel of high court
judges “enemies of the people”, for their ruling that parliament needed to be
consulted on Brexit, those who were outraged by the phrase turned to their
collected works of European history, looking for the chapters on the 1930s.
The Great
Depression
So the
reflex is well-honed. But is it sound? Does any comparison of today and the
1930s hold up?
The starting point is surely economic, not least because the one thing everyone knows about the 30s – and which is common to both the US and European experiences of that decade – is the Great Depression. The current convulsions can be traced back to the crash of 2008, but the impact of that event and the shock that defined the 30s are not an even match. When discussing our own time, Krugman speaks instead of the Great Recession: a huge and shaping event, but one whose impact – measured, for example, in terms of mass unemployment – is not on the same scale. US joblessness reached 25% in the 1930s; even in the depths of 2009 it never broke the 10% barrier.
The starting point is surely economic, not least because the one thing everyone knows about the 30s – and which is common to both the US and European experiences of that decade – is the Great Depression. The current convulsions can be traced back to the crash of 2008, but the impact of that event and the shock that defined the 30s are not an even match. When discussing our own time, Krugman speaks instead of the Great Recession: a huge and shaping event, but one whose impact – measured, for example, in terms of mass unemployment – is not on the same scale. US joblessness reached 25% in the 1930s; even in the depths of 2009 it never broke the 10% barrier.
The
political sphere reveals another mismatch between then and now. The 30s were
characterised by ultra-nationalist and fascist movements seizing power in
leading nations: Germany, Italy and Spain most obviously. The world is waiting
nervously for the result of France’s presidential election in May: victory for
Marine Le Pen would be seized on as the clearest proof yet that the spirit of
the 30s is resurgent.
There is
similar apprehension that Geert Wilders – who speaks of ridding the country of
“Moroccan scum” – has led the polls ahead of Holland’s general election on
Wednesday. And plenty of liberals will be perfectly content for the Christian
Democrat Angela Merkel to prevail over her Social Democratic rival, Martin
Schulz, just so long as the far-right Alternative für Deutschland makes no
ground. Still, so far and as things stand, in Europe only Hungary and Poland have
governments that seem doctrinally akin to those that flourished in the 30s.
That leaves
the US, which dodged the bullet of fascistic rule in the 30s – although at
times the success of the America First movement, which at its peak could count
on more than 800,000 paid-up members, suggested such an outcome was far from
impossible. (Hence the intended irony in the title of Sinclair Lewis’s 1935
novel, It Can’t Happen Here.)
Donald
Trump has certainly had Americans reaching for their history textbooks, fearful
that his admiration for strongmen, his contempt for restraints on executive
authority, and his demonisation of minorities and foreigners means he marches
in step with the demagogues of the 30s.
But even
those most anxious about Trump still focus on the form the new presidency could
take rather than the one it is already taking. David Frum, a speechwriter to
George W Bush, wrote a much-noticed essay for the Atlantic titled, “How to
build an autocracy”. It was billed as setting out “the playbook Donald Trump
could use to set the country down a path towards illiberalism”. He was not
arguing that Trump had already embarked on that route, just that he could (so
long as the media came to heel and the public grew weary and worn down,
shrugging in the face of obvious lies and persuaded that greater security was
worth the price of lost freedoms).
Similarly,
Trump has unloaded rhetorically on the free press – castigating them,
Mail-style, as “enemies of the people” – but he has not closed down any
newspapers. He meted out the same treatment via Twitter to a court that blocked
his travel ban, rounding on the “so-called judge” – but he did eventually
succumb to the courts’ verdict and withdrew his original executive order. He
did not have the dissenting judges sacked or imprisoned; he has not moved to
register or intern every Muslim citizen in the US; he has not suggested they
wear identifying symbols.
These are
crumbs of comfort; they are not intended to minimise the real danger Trump
represents to the fundamental norms that underpin liberal democracy. Rather,
the point is that we have not reached the 1930s yet. Those sounding the alarm
are suggesting only that we may be travelling in that direction – which is bad
enough.
Two further
contrasts between now and the 1930s, one from each end of the sociological
spectrum, are instructive. First, and particularly relevant to the US, is to
ask: who is on the streets? In the 30s, much of the conflict was played out at
ground level, with marchers and quasi-military forces duelling for control. The
clashes of the Brownshirts with communists and socialists played a crucial part
in the rise of the Nazis. (A turning point in the defeat of Oswald Mosley,
Britain’s own little Hitler, came with his humbling in London’s East End, at
the 1936 battle of Cable Street.)
But those
taking to the streets today – so far – have tended to be opponents of the lurch
towards extreme nationalism. In the US, anti-Trump movements – styling
themselves, in a conscious nod to the 1930s, as “the resistance” – have filled
city squares and plazas. The Women’s March led the way on the first day of the
Trump presidency; then those protesters and others flocked to airports in huge
numbers a week later, to obstruct the refugee ban. Those demonstrations have
continued, and they supply an important contrast with 80 years ago. Back then,
it was the fascists who were out first – and in force.
Snyder
notes another key difference. “In the 1930s, all the stylish people were
fascists: the film critics, the poets and so on.” He is speaking chiefly about
Germany and Italy, and doubtless exaggerates to make his point, but he is right
that today “most cultural figures tend to be against”. There are exceptions –
Le Pen has her celebrity admirers, but Snyder speaks accurately when he says
that now, in contrast with the 30s, there are “few who see fascism as a
creative cultural force”.
Links:
Donations can be sent
to the Baltimore Nonviolence Center, 325 E. 25th St., Baltimore, MD
21218. Ph: 410-323-1607; Email: mobuszewski [at] verizon.net. Go to http://baltimorenonviolencecenter.blogspot.com/
"The master class
has always declared the wars; the subject class has always fought the battles.
The master class has had all to gain and nothing to lose, while the subject
class has had nothing to gain and everything to lose--especially their
lives." Eugene Victor Debs
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