9/11 REVISITED
Was
By Paul Church
February 11, 2012
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/NB11Ak03.html
At 9:37 Eastern Daylight Time on September 11, 2001,
American Airlines Flight 77 slammed into the western
side of the Pentagon, killing all 59 passengers and 125
others in the building. News of the crash went global
within minutes; yet another symbol of American power
was ablaze. For the few still struggling to believe
that the
evaporated like the bodies of the many dead.
Conspiracists have puzzled for a decade over the
failure to intercept the aircraft - or indeed, take
even the elementary step of phoning the Pentagon to
warn them of the approach. But only recently has wider
attention been paid to the failure of the Central
Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) Bin Laden unit to tell
anyone that "muscle" hijackers, Khalid al-Midhar and
Nawaf al-Hazmi, were in the country.
The chairman of the 9/11 Commission, Thomas Keane, is
now on record [1] as calling this "one of the most
troubling aspects of our entire report". How is it
that, despite having known for several months about al-
Midhar and al-Hazmi, nobody at Alec Station saw fit to
mention them to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), the counter-terrorism policy board in
The Bin Laden Issue Station - codenamed Alec by
insiders such as US Army Lieutenant Colonel Anthony
Shaffer - was the CIA unit dedicated to reporting on
al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and militants in
authorities in
"terror summit" at which plans for 9/11 were probably
finalized. Both al-Midhar and al-Hazmi were at that meeting.
Accounts differ as to exactly when the CIA became aware
of the hijackers' presence in
orders were issued not to share the information: Doug
Miller, an FBI agent loaned to the Bin Laden unit, was
among those who received the instructions. In his book
Pretext for War, author James Bamford quotes another
FBI agent loaned to Alec: "[T]hey didn't want the
bureau meddling in their business - that's why they
didn't tell ... that's why September 11 happened."
Author
desperate was the CIA to get a source inside al-Qaeda,
the agency shielded the aspiring terrorists while it
tried to recruit them. In his book The
Wright also suggests a more serious possibility:
lacking any domestic jurisdiction, the agency colluded
with Saudi Arabian intelligence to keep their own
fingerprints off events. According to Wright, this was
the view of a team of FBI investigators known as Squad I-49.
In an interview for the documentary Who Is Richard
Blee?, former counter-terrorism czar Richard Clarke was
another insider to hint at possible Saudi involvement.
Sensationally, Clarke also accused Central Intelligence
Department head George Tenet of personally withholding
evidence from
Filmmakers John Duffy and Ray Nowosielski managed to
identify two key analysts involved in burying the
evidence. Despite legal threats from the agency [2],
the film is now available as a podcast.
Backtrack to January 2003: Prince Bandar bin Sultan is
head of the Saudi Embassy in
man at the center of the al-Yammah arms deal, a
corruption scandal involving the exchange of arms for
crude oil with
arrived in
Bandar's close ties with the Bush family are common
knowledge. Less widely known is that in January 2003,
the Saudi Prince sat with vice president Dick Cheney,
defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld and General Richard
Myers discussing
In his book Plan of Attack, investigative journalist
Bob Woodward claimed that when Bandar was handed a map
labeled "Top Secret Noforn" in the vice president's
office, not even the secretary of state had been
informed that his country would be at war. Colin Powell
has denied this, but the incident serves to illustrate
the prince's extraordinary access to the inner workings
of government.
All the more shocking, then, that between 1998 and
2002, up to US$73,000 in cashier cheques was funneled
by Bandar's wife
Bushes as like "my mother and father" - to two
Californian families known to have bankrolled al-Midhar
and al-Hazmi. The very same would-be terrorists
protected by the CIA.
Princess Haifa sent regular monthly payments of between
$2,000 and $3,500 to Majeda Dweikat, wife of Osama
Basnan, believed by various investigators to be a spy
for the Saudi government. Many of the cheques were
signed over to Manal Bajadr, wife of Omar al-Bayoumi,
himself suspected of covertly working for the kingdom.
The Basnans, the al-Bayoumis and the two 9/11 hijackers
once shared the same apartment block in
was al-Bayoumi who greeted the killers when they first
arrived in
assistance, with an apartment and social security
cards. He even helped the men enroll at flight schools
in
When al-Bayoumi moved to
attacks, his apartment was raided by Scotland Yard.
Beneath the floorboards were discovered the phone
numbers of several officials at the Saudi Embassy.
Bandar and his wife deny any links to terrorism, but
both former co-chairs of the
Committee, Richard Shelby and Bob Graham, think
otherwise. They claim the FBI refused to allow the
committee to interview investigators who had followed
the money from the embassy. Other sources allege that
the 9/11 Commission similarly failed to fully
investigate leads, partly because commissioner Phillip
Zelikow removed or relegated to footnotes any findings
which cast doubt on the Saudis. A 28-page section of
the Congressional Joint Inquiry report exploring
possible foreign government involvement remains classified.
Then there is the suppressed testimony of Special Agent
Steven Butler, described by officials familiar with his
account as "explosive". [3]
a flow of Saudi money to the would-be hijackers. After
he testified, staff director for the 9/11 Committee
Eleanor Hill sent a memo to the Justice Department
detailing
the Justice Department about the content of
testimony, they were told it was classified.
If possible Saudi Arabian involvement in 9/11 raised
eyebrows at the Justice Department, what would they
have made of mysterious but little publicized meetings
between the Saudi ambassador and George Tenet? In his
book State of
Tenet "set the tone for the CIA's Saudi relationship by
relying heavily on developing close relationships with
top Saudi officials, including Prince Bandar bin Sultan
..."
Around once a month, Tenet would slip away to Bandar's
estate in
refused to tell officers working under him what they
were discussing. Colleagues would complain that it was
difficult for them to tell what deals were being made
with the Saudis. Were al-Midhar or al-Hazmi ever
mentioned?
"Bandar and Tenet had a very close relationship,"
confirmed one CIA officer.
The frantic rush to get Saudi Arabian nationals -
including members of the Bin Laden family - out of
public outrage, and was featured in Michael Moore's
seminal but flawed documentary, Fahrenheit 911. Less
was made of a return trip by Crown Prince Abdullah,
then de facto ruler of
Prince, Prince Saud al-Faisal and Prince Bandar bin
Sultan were scheduled to meet president George W Bush,
Dick Cheney, Colin Powell and national security advisor
Condoleezza Rice at the president's ranch in
No fewer than eight airliners arrived from Saudi
Arabia, and as the planes landed,
learned that two members of the royal entourage were on
a terrorist watchlist. The next day, Osama Basnan
reported his passport stolen to
proving he was in
prince. Were the wanted men on the planes Basnan and
al-Bayoumi?
According to the Wall Street Journal, the FBI planned
to "storm the plane and pull those guys off" until,
evidently fearing an international incident, the State
Department intervened.
Notes 1. Insiders voice doubts about CIA's 9/11 story
Salon, October 14, 2011.
http://www.salon.com/2011/10/14/insiders_voice_doubts_ca_911/
2. See CIA's Maneuver: A Case of Bluffing? Buying Time?
Or Something More? September 13, 2011.
3. The road to Riyadh US News, November 29, 2002.
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/features/saudi_021129.htm
Paul Church is an independent journalist reporting on
geopolitics, warfare and counter-terrorism.
(Copyright 2012
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