Why Paul
Krugman Is Wrong About the 1990s
May 27, 2016
Rana Foroohar
Thursday, May 26, 2016
Time magazine
I’ve been
pondering Paul Krugman’s recent column [1] in
the New York Times about how great the 1990s were economically. Hillary Clinton
has, of course, been saying the same thing on the campaign trail. In fact, she
wants to put her husband Bill back in charge of the economy if she’s elected—a
mistake, in my opinion, both on economic grounds and because it smacks of
nepotism.
The key
question is this: What is the true economic narrative about the 1990s? In other
words, was it a time of shared American prosperity brought on by smart policy?
Or was it a time when the style of laissez-faire attitudes forged in the 1980s
was co-opted by Democrats and began to create the growing inequality and
periodic crises we’ve since become used to?
It’s risky
to take issue with a Nobel laureate, but having just written a book [2] that
looks deeply at some of these issues, I’m going to go out on a limb and say
that Krugman has it partly wrong when he waxes nostalgic about the “boom” days
of the 1990s.
For
starters, most of the 1990s did not produce a boom for ordinary people. Wages
for the bottom 90% of the population in America were flat until 1996. (If you
want to track the data yourself, check out this wonderful interactive graphic [3] from
the Economic Policy Institute, a think tank affiliated with the labor movement,
which allows you to set the frame anywhere you like over the last 100 years.)
After that, the wage share of the lower 90 % began growing slightly, and in the
last couple years of the 90s, America got some decent wage growth for average
people.
Why did
this happen? Because the Federal Reserve kept interest rates quite low which
allowed for full employment. This was in part because there was little risk of
inflation due to globalization and new technologies; unemployment was around
3.9% in the late-1990s. That also encouraged a stock boom, which for a period
of time meant more private investment into the economy. Finally, there was a
brief productivity boom from new technology, which made investors bullish on
the future and helped contribute to some wage growth.
As we know,
however, none of this lasted. By 2001, the dot com crash (a result of that
stock bubble) had wiped out much of the investment boom. Productivity dipped
and hasn’t gone up since. Incomes for average people have been stagnating, and
we’ve gone back to business as usual—the 1% taking the vast majority of all
income gains.
In his
column, Krugman advocates thinking about the policies of the 1990s as a model
for how to create another bout of prosperity. But what were those policies,
exactly?
Bob Rubin,
then Treasury secretary, balanced the budget and focused on market-led growth,
rather than the massive public investment plan advocated by the other Bob,
former labor secretary Robert Reich. Reich’s strategy of real, sustained
investment in infrastructure and education (which Bill Clinton actually
campaigned on) was deep sixed in favor of a more market-oriented, quick hit
growth plan.
“I pushed
hard for a major public investment strategy, but it got ground up in demands
from Republicans and some Democrats to cut the budget deficit,” says Reich, now
a professor at Berkeley. “In some ways, it was an early exercise in austerity
economics.”
Would the
Rubin strategy work today? Absolutely not. If we tried to balance the budget
right now, we’d get European-style austerity. And while we still rely on the
sugar high of super low interest rates, their effectiveness for boosting Main
Street has decreased. Low rates have led to record stock prices, but Main
Street growth is still sluggish, and wages are still relatively flat (as is
productivity).
The
Band-Aid of easy money that worked in the 1990s simply won’t work anymore. It
only changes asset prices–not what’s actually happening on Main Street. Central
banks can buy time for governments to do real fiscal stimulus. But they can’t
fix what’s wrong with the underlying system all by themselves.
What’s
more, one of the solutions Krugman advocates is actually the one that Bill
Clinton’s administration didn’t take up–a massive infrastructure program. In
fact, public investment as a percentage of GDP in the U.S. began falling in the
1990s. While it’s true that Clinton made some investments in education and
infrastructure (and spent a lot of time talking about the “information superhighway [4]”), they
weren’t anywhere near the levels that would have changed the underlying growth
paradigm.
The wrong
Bob won the liberal economic debate of the 1990s. That’s why the decade brought
a false, financialized growth that quickly evaporated at the first bubble
popping, rather than the real thing. (I actually left journalism briefly to
work in a high-tech incubator and, for this sin, I got to watch the bubble pop
first-hand).
This is
exactly why I worry when I hear that Hillary wants to put Bill back in charge.
The suggestion begs an uncomfortable question: Has she learned the lessons of
the 1990s?
Maybe.
Clinton recently proclaimed her desire to pull off a bold public infrastructure
program. And she’s been somewhat critical of the ramifications of certain go-go
90s phenomenon like share buybacks (which create saccharine growth by
artificially jacking up the value of company stock, which increases
inequality).
But I have
yet to hear a full tally of what Hillary thinks was right about the 1990s,
policy wise–and what wasn’t. In today’s economic climate, simply laying claim
to the good parts of the 90s without explicitly outing the bad is not enough.
Certainly,
we should be thinking about how to achieve a healthier labor market, but we
also need to recognize that just letting the markets do their thing, as many in
Bill Clinton’s administration advocated, isn’t a real growth strategy. It’s a
head fake. In that sense, it’s misguided to lavish unadulterated praise for the
era. The economic policy of the 90s only worked for some people, some of the
time.
Rana
Foroohar is an assistant managing editor at TIME and the magazine’s economics
columnist. She’s the author of Makers and Takers: The Rise of Finance and the Fall of
American Business [5].
Links:
[2] http://time.com/4327419/american-capitalisms-great-crisis/?iid=sr-link1
[3] http://stateofworkingamerica.org/who-gains/#/?start=1917&end=1918
[4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_superhighway
[5] http://www.amazon.com/dp/0553447238/?tag=timecom-20
[3] http://stateofworkingamerica.org/who-gains/#/?start=1917&end=1918
[4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_superhighway
[5] http://www.amazon.com/dp/0553447238/?tag=timecom-20
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"The master class
has always declared the wars; the subject class has always fought the battles.
The master class has had all to gain and nothing to lose, while the subject
class has had nothing to gain and everything to lose--especially their
lives." Eugene Victor Debs
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