Bombing Hiroshima changed the world, but
it didn't end WWII
A photo taken July 16, 1945 shows
an aerial view after the first atomic explosion at the Trinity Test site in New
Mexico. (Associated Press)
President Obama’s visit to Hiroshima
on Friday has rekindled public debate about the U.S. atomic bombings of Japan —
one largely suppressed since the Smithsonian canceled its Enola Gay exhibit in
1995. Obama, aware that his critics are ready to pounce if he casts the
slightest doubt on the rectitude of President Harry S. Truman’s decision to use
atomic bombs, has opted to remain silent on the issue. This is unfortunate. A
national reckoning is overdue.
Most
Americans have been taught that using atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in
August 1945 was justified because the bombings ended the war in the Pacific,
thereby averting a costly U.S. invasion of Japan. This erroneous contention
finds its way into high school history texts still today. More dangerously, it
shapes the thinking of government officials and military planners working in a
world that still contains more than 15,000 nuclear weapons.
Truman
exulted in the obliteration of Hiroshima, calling it “the greatest thing in
history.” America’s military leaders didn’t share his exuberance. Seven of
America’s eight five-star officers in 1945 — Gens. Dwight Eisenhower,
Douglas MacArthur and Henry Arnold, and Adms. William Leahy, Chester Nimitz,
Ernest King and William Halsey — later called the atomic bombings either
militarily unnecessary, morally reprehensible, or both. Nor did the bombs
succeed in their collateral purpose: cowing the Soviets.
Leahy, who
was Truman’s personal chief of staff, wrote in his memoir that the “Japanese
were already defeated and ready to surrender…. The use of this barbarous weapon
at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against
Japan.” MacArthur went further. He told former President Hoover that if the
United States had assured the Japanese that they could keep the emperor they
would have gladly surrendered in late May.
It was not
the atomic evisceration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that ended the Pacific war.
Instead, it was the Soviet invasion of Manchuria and other Japanese colonies
that began at midnight on Aug. 8, 1945 — between the two bombings.
For months,
Allied intelligence had been reporting that a Soviet invasion would knock Japan
out of the war. On April 11, for example, the Joint Intelligence Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staffpredicted, “If at any time the USSR
should enter the war, all Japanese will realize that absolute defeat is
inevitable.”
Truman
understood the stakes. He knew the Soviet invasion would end the war. ... But
he decided to use the atomic bombs anyway.
The
Americans, having broken Japanese codes, were aware of Japan’s desperation to
negotiate peace with the U.S. before the Soviets invaded. Truman himself
described an intercepted cable from July 18, 1945, as the “telegram from the
Jap emperor asking for peace.” Indeed, Truman went to the mid-July summit in
Potsdam to make sure that the Soviets were keeping their Yalta conference
promise to come into the Pacific war. When Stalin gave him the assurance on
July 17, Truman wrote in his diary, “He’ll be in the Jap War on August 15. Fini
Japs when that comes about.” Truman reiterated this in a letter to his wife the
next day: “We’ll end the war a year sooner now, and think of the kids who won’t
be killed.”
In quickly
routing Japan’s Kwantung army, the Soviets ruined Japan’s diplomatic and
military end game: keep inflicting military losses on the U.S. and get Stalin’s
help negotiating better surrender terms.
The atomic
bombings, terrible and inhumane as they were, played little role in Japanese
leaders’ calculations to quickly surrender. After all, the U.S. had firebombed
more than 100 Japanese cities. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were just two more cities
destroyed; whether the attack required one bomb or thousands didn’t much
matter. As Gen. Torashirō Kawabe, the deputy chief of staff, later told
U.S. interrogators, the depth of devastation wrought in Hiroshima and Nagasaki
only became known “in a gradual manner.” But “in comparison, the Soviet entry
into the war was a great shock.”
When Prime
Minister Kantaro Suzuki was asked on Aug. 10 why Japan needed to surrender so
quickly, he explained, “the Soviet Union will take not only Manchuria, Korea,
Karafuto, but also Hokkaido. This would destroy the foundation of Japan. We
must end the war when we can deal with the United States.” Japanese leaders
also feared the spread of Soviet-inspired communist uprisings and knew the
Soviets would not look kindly upon their paramount concerns — protecting the
emperor himself and preserving the emperor system.
Truman
understood the stakes. He knew the Soviet invasion would end the war. He knew
assuring Japan about the emperor might also lead to surrender. But he decided
to use the atomic bombs anyway.
While at
Potsdam, Truman received a report detailing the power of the bomb tested July
16 at Alamogordo, N.M. Afterward he “was a changed man,” according to
Winston Churchill. He began bossing Stalin around. And he authorized use of the
bomb against Japan. If his newfound assertiveness at Potsdam didn’t show Stalin
who was boss, Truman figured, Hiroshima certainly would.
Stalin got
the message. Atomic bombs were now a fundamental part of the U.S. arsenal, and
not just as a last resort. He ordered Soviet scientists to throw everything
they had into developing a Soviet bomb. The race was on. Eventually, the two
sides would accumulate the equivalent of 1.5 million Hiroshima bombs. And as
Manhattan Project physicist I.I. Rabi astutely observed, “Suddenly the day of
judgment was the next day and has been ever since.”
Oliver Stone
is an Academy Award-winning writer and director. History professor Peter
Kuznick is director of the Nuclear Studies Institute at American University.
They co-authored the Showtime documentary series and book, “The Untold History
of the United States.”
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