Published on Portside (https://portside.org)
Does Henry
Kissinger Have a Conscience?
Jon Lee Anderson
Saturday, August 20, 2016
The New Yorker
Last March, when President Obama travelled to Argentina to meet
with the country’s new President, Mauricio Macri, his public appearances were
dogged by protesters who noisily demanded explanations, and apologies, for U.S.
policies, past and present. There are few countries in the West where
anti-Americanism is as vociferously expressed as in Argentina, where a highly
politicized culture of grievance has evolved in which many of the country’s
problems are blamed on the United States. On the left, especially, there is
lingering resentment over the support extended by the U.S. government to
Argentina’s right-wing military, which seized power in March of 1976 and
launched a “Dirty War” against leftists that took thousands of lives over the
following seven years.
Obama’s visit [1] coincided
with the fortieth anniversary of the coup. He pointedly paid homage to the
Dirty War’s victims by visiting a shrine built in their honor on the outskirts
of Buenos Aires. In an address he gave at the shrine, Obama acknowledged what
he characterized as American sins of omission, but he stopped short of issuing
an outright apology. “Democracies have to have the courage to acknowledge when
we don’t live up to the ideals that we stand for,” he said. “And we’ve been
slow to speak out for human rights, and that was the case here.”
In the
run-up to Obama’s trip, Susan Rice, the President’s national-security adviser,
had announced the Administration’s intention to declassify thousands of U.S.
military and intelligence documents pertaining to that tumultuous period in
Argentina. It was a good-will gesture aimed at signalling Obama’s ongoing
effort to change the dynamic of U.S. relations with Latin America—“to bury the
last remnant of the Cold War,” as he said in Havana [2], during
that same trip.
Last week,
the first tranche of those declassified documents [3] was
released. The documents revealed that White House and U.S. State Department
officials were intimately aware of the Argentine military’s bloody nature, and
that some were horrified by what they knew. Others, most notably Henry
Kissinger, were not. In a 1978 cable, the U.S. Ambassador, Raúl Castro, wrote
about a visit by Kissinger to Buenos Aires, where he was a guest of the
dictator, Jorge Rafael Videla, while the country hosted the World Cup. “My only
concern is that Kissinger’s repeated high praise for Argentina’s action in
wiping out terrorism may have gone to some considerable extent to his hosts’
heads,” Castro wrote [4]. The
Ambassador went on to write, fretfully, “There is some danger that Argentines
may use Kissinger’s laudatory statements as justification for hardening their
human rights stance.”
The latest
revelations compound a portrait of Kissinger as the ruthless cheerleader, if
not the active co-conspirator, of Latin American military regimes engaged in
war crimes. In evidence that emerged from previous declassifications of
documents during the Clinton Administration, Kissinger was shown not only to
have been aware of what the military was doing but to have actively encouraged
it. Two days after the Argentine coup, Kissinger was briefed by his Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, William Rogers, who warned him,
“I think also we’ve got to expect a fair amount of repression, probably a good
deal of blood, in Argentina before too long. I think they’re going to have to
come down very hard not only on the terrorists but on the dissidents of trade
unions and their parties.” Kissinger replied, “Whatever chance they have, they
will need a little encouragement . . . because I do want to
encourage them. I don’t want to give the sense that they’re harassed by the
United States.”
Under
Kissinger’s direction, they certainly were not harassed. Right after the coup,
Kissinger sent his encouragement to the generals and reinforced that message by
expediting a package of U.S. security assistance. In a meeting with the
Argentine foreign minister two months later, Kissinger advised him winkingly,
according to a memo [5] written
about the conversation, “We are aware you are in a difficult period. It is a
curious time, when political, criminal, and terrorist activities tend to merge
without any clear separation. We understand you must establish
authority. . . . If there are things that have to be done, you
should do them quickly.”
Argentina’s
military forces had launched their coup in order to expand and institutionalize
a war that was already under way against leftist guerrillas and their
sympathizers. They called their campaign the Process of National
Reorganization, or, simply, “el proceso.” During the Dirty War [6], as it
became known, as many as thirty thousand people were secretly abducted,
tortured, and executed by the security forces. Hundreds of suspects were buried
in anonymous mass graves, while thousands more were stripped naked, drugged,
loaded onto military aircraft, and hurled into the sea from the air while they
were still alive. The term “los desaparecidos”—“the disappeared”—became
one of Argentina’s contributions to the global lexicon.
At the time of the coup, Gerald Ford was the caretaker U.S.
President, and Henry Kissinger was serving as both Secretary of State and
national-security adviser, as he had done under Nixon. Immediately after the
Argentine coup, on Kissinger’s recommendations, the U.S. Congress approved a
request for fifty million dollars in security assistance to the junta; this was
topped off by another thirty million before the end of the year.
Military-training programs and aircraft sales worth hundreds of millions of
dollars were also approved. In 1978, a year into Jimmy Carter’s Presidency,
mounting concerns about human-rights violations brought an end to U.S. aid.
Thereafter, the new Administration sought to cut the junta off from
international financial assistance. In early 1981, with Reagan coming into the
White House, however, the restrictions were lifted.
There have,
in fact, been no legal consequences whatsoever to Kissinger for his actions in
Chile, where three thousand people were murdered by Pinochet’s thugs, or for
those in Vietnam and Cambodia, where he ordered large-scale aerial bombardments
that cost the lives of countless civilians. One of his foremost critics was the
late Christopher Hitchens [7], who in
2001 wrote a book-length indictment entitled “The Trial of Henry Kissinger.”
Hitchens called for Kissinger’s prosecution “for war crimes, for crimes against
humanity, and for offenses against common or customary or international law,
including conspiracy to commit murder, kidnap, and torture.”
While
Argentina’s Dirty War was taking place, of course, its generals habitually
denied that anything untoward was occurring. Questioned about los
desaparecidos, the coup leader, General Videla, explained with chilling
vagueness, “The disappeared are just that: disappeared. They are neither alive
nor dead. They are disappeared.” Other officers suggested that missing people
were probably in hiding, carrying out terrorist actions against the fatherland.
In fact, the vast majority were being brutalized in secret prisons by
government-salaried employees, and then, more often than not, executed. As
happened in Germany during the Holocaust, most Argentines understood what was
really going on, but kept silent out of a spirit of complicity, or fear. A
see-no-evil national refrain was adopted by those Argentines who witnessed
neighbors being dragged from their homes by plainclothes men, never to return:
“Algo habrán hecho”—“they must have done something.”
We have
repeatedly reviewed evidence of Kissinger’s callousness. Some of it is as
inexplicable as it is shocking. There is a macho swagger in some of Kissinger’s
remarks. It could, perhaps, be explained away if he had never wielded power,
like—thus far—the gratuitously offensive Presidential candidate Donald Trump. And
one has an awareness that Kissinger, the longest-lasting and most iconic pariah
figure in modern American history, is but one of a line of men held in fear and
contempt for the immorality of their services rendered and yet protected by the
political establishment in recognition of those same services. William Tecumseh
Sherman, Curtis LeMay, Robert McNamara, and, more recently, Donald Rumsfeld all
come to mind.
In Errol
Morris’s remarkable 2003 documentary “The Fog of War,” we saw that McNamara,
who was an octogenarian at the time, was a tormented man who was attempting to
come to terms, unsuccessfully, with the immense moral burden of his actions as
the U.S. defense secretary during Vietnam. McNamara had recently written a
memoir in which he attempted to grapple with his legacy.
Around that time, a
journalist named Stephen Talbot interviewed McNamara, and then also secured an
interview with Kissinger. As he later wrote about his initial meeting with
Kissinger, “I told him I had just interviewed Robert McNamara in Washington.
That got his attention. He stopped badgering me, and then he did an
extraordinary thing. He began to cry. But no, not real tears. Before my eyes,
Henry Kissinger was acting. ‘Boohoo, boohoo,’ Kissinger said, pretending to cry
and rub his eyes. ‘He’s still beating his breast, right? Still feeling guilty.’
He spoke in a mocking, singsong voice and patted his heart for emphasis.”
McNamara
died in 2009, at the same age Kissinger is today—ninety-three—but his belated
public struggle with his conscience helped leaven his clouded reputation. Now
that he is nearing the end of his life, Kissinger must wonder what his own
legacy is to be. He can rest assured that, at the very least, his steadfast
support for the American superpower project, no matter what the cost in lives,
will be a major part of that legacy. Unlike McNamara, however, whose attempt to
find a moral reckoning Kissinger held in such scorn, Kissinger has shown little
in the way of a conscience. And because of that, it seems highly likely,
history will not easily absolve him.
Jon Lee
Anderson, a staff writer, began contributing to The New Yorker in
1998.
Links:
[1] http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/obamas-bittersweet-visit-to-argentina
[2] http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/cuba-after-obama-left
[3] https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/148650765298/argentina-declassification-project
[4] http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB556-Obama-administration-declassifies-documents-on-Argentina-military-human-rights-abuses/
[5] http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB133/
[6] http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/03/19/children-of-the-dirty-war
[7] http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/10/16/he-knew-he-was-right-2
[2] http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/cuba-after-obama-left
[3] https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/148650765298/argentina-declassification-project
[4] http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB556-Obama-administration-declassifies-documents-on-Argentina-military-human-rights-abuses/
[5] http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB133/
[6] http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/03/19/children-of-the-dirty-war
[7] http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/10/16/he-knew-he-was-right-2
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to the Baltimore Nonviolence Center, 325 E. 25th St., Baltimore, MD 21218.
Ph: 410-323-1607; Email: mobuszewski [at] verizon.net. Go to http://baltimorenonviolencecenter.blogspot.com/
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has always declared the wars; the subject class has always fought the battles.
The master class has had all to gain and nothing to lose, while the subject
class has had nothing to gain and everything to lose--especially their
lives." Eugene Victor Debs
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