Thursday, February 21,
2019
‘Willing
Pawns in Trump-Orchestrated Coup’: CODEPINK Disrupts Venezuela’s Illegitimate
‘US Ambassador’
CODEPINK activists disrupted an event with the right-wing
Venezuelan coup regime’s “US ambassador” Carlos Vecchio, denouncing him for
seeking “a path of civil war and US intervention.”
CODEPINK co-founder Medea
Benjamin walked on stage at the February 21 event and grabbed
the mic: “These people are a fraud. They don’t represent the Venezuelan people.
They are representing the US-orchestrated coup,” she said.
“These
people here want to take Venezuela to a path of civil war and US intervention,”
Benjamin continued.
Vecchio,
who was educated in and later defected to the United States, co-founded
Venezuela’s notorious right-wing Popular Will party with the coup-mongering
opposition leader Leopoldo López.
“If
you indeed care about the people of Venezuela, you will be calling for
negotiations.”
Vecchio,
Guaidó, and Venezuela’s right-wing coup operatives have been working closely
with the US government to plan a stunt on the Colombia border on February 23,
hyping a fabricated “humanitarian crisis” to
justify US military intervention.
“This
is a very dangerous situation. They want to create a crisis at the border that
would be a justification for US intervention,” Benjamin explained in her
speech.
“This
has nothing to do with a humanitarian situation. Indeed, for a humanitarian situation,
the US would lift the economic sanctions that have exacerbated the crisis,” she
said.
CODEPINK national
co-director Ariel Gold joined her colleague on stage,
holding a sign reading “No coup in Venezuela.”
“The
issue at the border now is something that is politicizing humanitarian aid,”
Benjamin explained. “That is why the Red Cross, the United Nations, and all the
legitimate humanitarian groups have insisted that they will not touch with this
aid.”
Benjamin
called for political negotiations mediated by Mexico, Uruguay, and the Vatican.
“If you indeed care about the people of Venezuela, you will be calling for negotiations,” she said. “You will not recognize these people who are willing pawns in a Trump-orchestrated coup d’état.”
This is the world we live in. This is the world we cover.
https://truthout.org/articles/what-happened-to-latin-americas-socialism/
What Happened to the Struggle for
Socialism in Latin America?
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez greets
supporters at a march, January 23, 2002, in Caracas, Venezuela.OSCAR SABETTA /
GETTY IMAGES
February 21, 2019
At the beginning of
the 21st century,
Latin America saw an upsurge of grassroots struggle that brought several left
governments to power — a historical moment known as the “pink tide.” Yet, in
the last few years, popular discontent has grown toward these governments, and
far-right leaders, like Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, have come to power. What is
happening to the Latin American left? Is its decline solely the fault of US
imperialism? Or were there fundamental problems in the project of 21stcentury socialism? Truthout spoke to
author Mike Gonzalez about his new book, The Ebb of the Pink Tide: The Decline of the Left in Latin
America. Gonzalez argues that the economic policies of pink
tide governments and the ways in which they have wielded political power have
recreated the popular discontent that brought them to power in the first place.
Anton Woronczuk: In the introduction to The Ebb of the Pink Tide, you discuss how “pink tide” governments came to power during a
time of mass struggle from the grassroots, and cite Bolivian President Evo
Morales, who described his government as “a government of the social
movements.” What gave rise to these movements?
Mike Gonzalez: Throughout the
1990s, a newly confident neoliberalism imposed its domination across Latin
America. The anodyne phrase “structural adjustment” concealed a devastating
process of globalization that had begun as the Berlin Wall fell. Under the
rules now imposed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) for the global market,
all forms of state intervention in the economy were forbidden. This meant state
subsidies — to farmers or transport, for example — welfare spending of any
kind, and so on. These all fell under the definition “restraint of trade” that
described anything that interfered with the pursuit of profit. The first sign
of things to come was the “Caracazo” uprising of the poor districts across
Venezuela in February 1989, which began with a hike in the price of public
transport. The Zapatista uprising in Mexico in January 1994, which coincided
with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), was a reaction to the
removal of subsidies to maize farmers to allow the giant U.S.-based monopolies
free rein. For the farmers, it meant ruin.
The weakened
states at best stood by and did nothing as the living standards of the masses
collapsed. At worst, they sent in their repressive forces to deal with the
rising protests. In Venezuela, the Caracazo was put down, leaving a toll of
3,000 dead. The local states collaborated with global capital, acting as its
agent; there were rich rewards, of course, for the loyalty of the minority who
profited from these arrangements.
The election
of [Hugo] Chávez was an expression of the gathering discontent — though still
in the formal framework of elections. In Cochabamba, Bolivia, however, the new
militancy from below produced a direct confrontation over the privatization of
the local water company. In Ecuador, the Indigenous movement that had created a
national organization (CONAIE) in 1990 also mobilized against the new economic
regime – in Ecuador’s case expressed in the “dollarization” of the economy. And
in Argentina, the collapse of the economy produced in December 2001 an
extraordinary movement under the slogan, “Que se vayan todos” – Let’s get rid
of them all (“them” being the political class). Here, too, the movement
embraced labor unions, militant movements of the unemployed, community
organizations, occupied factories, students and others.
How did the relationship with these movements change after the
“pink tide” governments came to power?
The
important thing here is that the social movements arose independently of the
state and of the political strategies and parties who were focused on state
power. John Holloway’s influential book, How to Change the World Without Taking Power,
underlined this quality of “autonomy” and celebrated the independence of the
movements. For a few short years, the movements were dominated by this idea of
autonomy. They acted outside the established political system, independently of
official political organizations and the parties of the left. Instead, the
movements produced new forms of resistance. In Bolivia, the town hall
assemblies, or cabildos
abiertos, expressed a new concept of collective organization, with
an emphasis on internal democracy and horizontality. In Venezuela, this
movement from below expressed itself forcefully when the attempted coup against
Chávez failed because of the mass mobilization of the majority population in
his support. So, the left governments were carried to power by a rising wave of
grassroots resistance. But the movement had no common project for power; its
independence was both a strength and a weakness. The logic of grassroots
democracy didn’t fit with the logic of electoralism, but the impulse from below
was translated into the occupation of the state. The movements demanded a
direct, participatory democracy – not a new version of the representative
system. But [those] who now claimed to speak on their behalf rose to occupy the
state. This contradiction is at the heart of both the pink tide as it rises,
and its ebb.
The movements demanded a direct,
participatory democracy. But [those] who now claimed to speak on their behalf
rose to occupy the state.
Many of
these governments used anti-capitalist discourse, but still maintained
relationships with foreign capital. Some of their defenders say the governments
had to engage with extractivism, such as mining, in order to provide the
material basis for socialism. How would you respond to this argument?
The left
governments came to power as a result of the mobilizations from below whose
demands were economic (the nationalization of natural resources and the
socialized redistribution of the income realized from their exploitation). But
critically, there was also a debate about dependency and the diversification of
the economy to break the chains of that dependence on … single product — oil,
copper, gold, agro –exports. Those two elements were interdependent. At the
same time, there was a core political demand to do with participatory
democracy, the accountability of public officials, and the recognition of the
rights and citizenship of Indigenous communities.
The
recognition of Indigenous rights was a cultural revolution. But the other two
elements had more far-reaching consequences. The promise to use oil and gas
revenues for the direct benefit of the majority population through state
services and public spending was the foundation of the left governments’ mass
support. But it also accepted, and indeed deepened, the core role of the
extractive industries in their programs. It was a contradiction which very
quickly created tensions.
Indigenous
territories were often the sites of the major mineral deposits that guaranteed
the income of the public sector.
In Ecuador,
Rafael Correa, who won the presidency in 2007, had within a few years
criminalized and arrested Indigenous leaders who were fighting the
multinationals exploiting their territories.
By the mid-2010s, all the pink tide
governments were committed to a renewed and expanded extractivist program in
conjunction with multinational capital.
In Bolivia, the
protests by farming communities in the TIPNIS National Park over the
construction of a major highway facilitating the exports taken out of the
country by Brazilian and Argentine multinationals, produced a repressive
response from the Morales government. The construction was suspended, but then
resumed.
In
Venezuela, a leading Indigenous activist, Sabino [Romero], who was fighting the
state coal company, was murdered together with members of his family. Despite
the high price of oil during the early part of the Chávez regime,
diversification never happened, though it was promised. In Venezuela, social
spending rose massively, but so, too, did the level and scale of corruption,
which Chávez finally recognized, too late, just before his death in 2013. So,
the promised break with global capital never came. More taxes and royalties
came into the national budget, but the relationship with the global market did
not change, and the dependency deepened.
By the
mid-2010s, all the pink tide governments were committed to a renewed and
expanded extractivist program in conjunction with multinational capital
(Chinese, Canadian, Russian as well as U.S.) – resistance to which had produced
the pink tide in the first place.
Let’s focus on the situation in Venezuela. You write, “While
Maduro’s administration of Venezuela has been and continues to be disastrous,
the roots of the problem lie in the Chávez era.” Yet Chávez founded a mass
socialist party and described his various initiatives as a transition to
socialism, while instituting state-subsidized food and health programs that
made a considerable difference in the quality of life for millions of
Venezuelans. How did this political program create the conditions for the
current crisis?
This is a
very complex question. But three elements are key. First, the promise to divert
oil revenues to social spending. This was hugely expensive, because it was not
planned — the Planning Minister Jorge Giordani came into increasing conflict
with Chávez during his second presidency. The absence of a plan resulted in
policies created in a reactive, short-term way. Chávez was anti-capitalist in
his discourse, but never had an anti-capitalist strategy. Expropriations were
purchases and often in reaction to the disinvestment or flight of a specific
capitalist.
In his last document, Chávez
recognized that far from transforming the state, the state had transformed and
corrupted his administration.
The deeper problem
was that this created a relationship of a kind of welfare dependency between
the majority and the state. Whatever Chávez’s intentions, the United Socialist
Party of Venezuela (PSUV), created in 2006, was not a mass democratic party,
but a centralized, top-down mechanism modelled on Cuba. The casualty was
participatory democracy itself.
After 2006,
Chávez’s appointees forged themselves into a ruling class, mimicking the system
of patronage and clientelism that had prevailed for 40 years before Chávez. In
his last document, Chávez recognized that far from transforming the state, the
state had transformed and corrupted his administration. But it was too late.
Maduro’s regime is authoritarian, controlled by the military whose culture of
command prevails at every level, fuelled by corruption on a massive scale.
Chávez did not have, despite his proclamation of 21st century socialism, a
developed socialist project. He was a revolutionary nationalist. In 2016,
Maduro nailed his colors to the mast. He announced the Arco Minero project,
inviting 150 foreign multinationals to exploit the huge mineral potential of
the Orinoco Basin. It was, in my view, the moment of counterrevolution.
What role do U.S. intervention and economic sanctions play in
creating the crisis facing Venezuela? Don’t we need to emphasize the role of
imperialism in the ebb of the “pink tide”?
Neither Maduro nor Guaidó has
anything to offer the millions who invested their hope in Chávez.
From the
perspective of today, the U.S. is playing a central role in undermining the
Maduro regime. But Maduro’s loss of support from his own Chavista base has to
do with his claim to socialist credentials while the population experiences
unprecedented levels of hunger in the country with the world’s largest oil
reserves. The coterie in power, who head the PSUV, has replaced popular support
with military control, repression and violence, together with corruption on a
massive scale. Production has collapsed, GDP is reduced by 50 percent, and
around 85 percent of necessary medicines and drugs are unavailable – the
remaining 15 percent are priced beyond the reach of most Venezuelans. The
minimum wage of those who have a job will buy them a large pack of diapers or a
dozen or so eggs. Yet no measures have been taken (as opposed to promised) to
control corruption, limit prices or suspend payment of the foreign debt. The
opposition parties, concerned as they claim to be for the fate of the people,
have offered no program to address the crisis since they won their majority in
the National Assembly in 2015. The mass demonstrations they have called do not
indicate mass support for the right, let alone for its extreme wing to which
[Juan] Guaidó belongs. It reflects the level of desperation of all Venezuelans
who will seize on any opportunity to protest.
For socialists, the only question is
how best to strengthen and support the political resistance of a mass movement
which has been disarmed by the manipulations of its leaders.
The most
astonishing thing is the complacency of the international left who will defend
this corrupt, cynical regime – the author of the crisis – on the simplistic
basis that Maduro sounds like a revolutionary, ignoring the reality of
working-class life in his Venezuela. Neither Maduro nor Guaidó has anything to
offer the millions who invested their hope in Chávez. Of course, U.S.
imperialism is playing its usual role in Latin America, reclaiming its natural
wealth for the profit of its home multinationals. But the reality is that the
choice is between several imperialisms — the U.S. and Guaidó, Russian and China
with Maduro. For socialists, the only question is how best to strengthen and
support the political resistance of a mass movement which has been disarmed by
the manipulations of its leaders but must now try to rediscover is strength and
independence for the struggles to come.
One leader for whom you reserve cautious optimism is Andrés
Manuel López Obrador, popularly known as AMLO, and you describe his
anti-corruption politics as serious, but ambiguous. Since your book was
published, just as he came to power, do you have a clearer assessment of what
role his government will play in the Mexican left?
The case of
AMLO in Mexico is fascinating. Since he first entered politics and made his bid
for the Mexican presidency, he has shifted his ground politically. In 2006, he
lost his bid for the presidency by a margin of less than 1 percent, amid
widespread and completely credible allegations of fraud (given Mexico’s history
in this regard). The protests against the fraud produced a huge movement of
protest that occupied Mexico City’s central avenue for almost a year.
He stood
again in 2012 and 2018, each time attenuating his radicalism and seeking
broader alliances. His reputation for honesty and his record won him a mass
following which finally led to his election to the presidency in 2018. His
campaign emphasized the fight against corruption, social justice and policies
for dealing with the violence that has consumed the society for many years.
This was enormously popular, especially given the record of the other
candidates. But his campaign had become increasingly populist, and there were
disturbing signs of compromise in the involvement of prominent right-wing
figures in his government and his policy team.
I would say
that he has been cautious in his first 100 days, though he refused to condemn
the Venezuelan government or recognize Guaidó. It may be tempting to see him as
a new Chávez – but his support was electoral, as was his political
organization. I would hesitate to characterize it as a social movement, capable
of independent mobilization. So the Mexican presidency remains as powerful and
as centralized as ever.
AMLO’s
relationship with Trump, too, has been cautious and diplomatic. His emphasis on
morality and honesty is welcome in a corrupt Mexican state, but he will surely
have in mind what has happened to the pink tide. He will seek to maintain some
degree of independence and cement his support through social measures. Where
that will take him, in the current volatile situation, is hard to predict.
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The
Ebb of the Pink Tide: The Decline of the Left in Latin America
In the past few years, Latin America’s left have suffered many
setbacks and reactionary challenges, leading many to wonder whether the “Pink
Tide” is now on the wane.
Copyright © Truthout. May not be
reprinted without permission.
Anton Woronczuk is an editor/copy editor at Truthout.
Donations can be sent
to the Baltimore Nonviolence Center, 325 E. 25th St., Baltimore, MD
21218. Ph: 410-323-1607; Email: mobuszewski2001 [at] comcast.net. Go to http://baltimorenonviolencecenter.blogspot.com/
"The master class
has always declared the wars; the subject class has always fought the battles.
The master class has had all to gain and nothing to lose, while the subject
class has had nothing to gain and everything to lose--especially their lives."
Eugene Victor Debs
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