Published on Alternet (http://www.alternet.org)
Major
Investigation Reveals Disturbing Connection Between U.S. Intelligence and Al
Qaeda Since 9/11
January 29, 2016
Over the
past year and a half, the United States and other military coalition members
have launched nearly 10,000 [3] strikes
in Iraq and Syria.
Zooming
out, the United States military has spent nearly the entire 21st century
engaged in an amorphous war on terrorism, in which the whole world is a
potential battlefield, from Yemen to Somalia to the now-expanding war in
Afghanistan. Lurking beneath the surface of the seemingly endless series of
military campaigns is the contradictory U.S. historical legacy of direct
support for some of the very extremist combatants the war on terror is
allegedly predicated on fighting.
A recent
in-depth investigation [4] published
in Harper’s by journalist Andrew Cockburn finds that the U.S. is
“teaming up with Al Qaeda, again," suggesting that this sinister legacy is
alive and well and raising disturbing questions about the logic underlying over
15 years of continuous war.
Cockburn is
not the first to point out the United States' role in backing such forces, and
some prominent voices are even openly calling [5] for
the U.S. to embrace Al Qaeda. But what his account does offer is a devastating
illustration of the historical symmetries, from Afghanistan in the 1980s to
Syria in the 21st century, underlying what he calls the U.S. government’s
“cold-blooded” calculations.
Cockburn
writes:
In the wake
of 9/11, the story of U.S. support for militant Islamists against the Soviets
became something of a touchy subject. Former CIA and intelligence officials
like to suggest that the agency simply played the roles of financier and
quartermaster. In this version of events, the dirty work — the actual
management of the campaign and the dealings with rebel groups — was left
to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). It was Pakistan’s fault that
at least 70 percent of total U.S. aid went to the fundamentalists, even if the
CIA demanded audited accounts on a regular basis.
Fast-forwarding
to more recent history, Cockburn notes that U.S. officials have been eager to
blame transgressions on allies:
[I]n 2014,
in a speech at Harvard, Vice President Joe Biden confirmed that we were arming
extremists once again, although he was careful to pin the blame on America’s
allies in the region, whom he denounced as “our largest problem in Syria.” In
response to a student’s question, he volunteered that our allies “were so
determined to take down Assad and essentially have a proxy Sunni-Shia war, what
did they do? They poured hundreds of millions of dollars and tens, thousands of
tons of weapons into anyone who would fight against Assad. Except that the
people who were being supplied were al-Nusra and Al Qaeda and the extremist
elements of jihadis coming from other parts of the world.”
But
Cockburn cites specific examples in which U.S. involvement was far more direct.
In the
spring and summer of last year, a coalition of Syrian rebel groups calling
itself Jaish al-Fatah — the Army of Conquest — swept through the
northwestern province of Idlib, posing a serious threat to the Assad regime.
Leading the charge was Al Qaeda’s Syrian branch, known locally as Jabhat
al-Nusra (the Nusra Front). The other major component of the coalition was
Ahrar al-Sham, a group that had formed early in the anti-Assad uprising and
looked for inspiration to none other than Abdullah Azzam. Following the
victory, Nusra massacred twenty members of the Druze faith, considered
heretical by fundamentalists, and forced the remaining Druze to convert to
Sunni Islam. (The Christian population of the area had wisely fled.) Ahrar
al-Sham meanwhile posted videos of the public floggings it administered to
those caught skipping Friday prayers.
This potent
alliance of jihadi militias had been formed under the auspices of the
rebellion’s major backers: Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar. But it also enjoyed
the endorsement of two other major players. At the beginning of the year, Al
Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri had ordered his followers to cooperate with
other groups. In March, according to several sources, a U.S.-Turkish-Saudi
“coordination room” in southern Turkey had also ordered the rebel groups it was
supplying to cooperate with Jaish al-Fatah. The groups, in other words, would
be embedded within the Al Qaeda coalition.
A few
months before the Idlib offensive, a member of one CIA-backed group had
explained the true nature of its relationship to the Al Qaeda franchise. Nusra,
he told the New York Times, allowed militias vetted by the United States to
appear independent, so that they would continue to receive American supplies.
When I asked a former White House official involved in Syria policy if this was
not a de facto alliance, he put it this way: “I would not say that Al Qaeda is
our ally, but a turnover of weapons is probably unavoidable. I’m fatalistic
about that. It’s going to happen.”
And in
another example, Cockburn writes:
The determination
of Turkey (a NATO ally) and Qatar (the host of the biggest American base in the
Middle East) to support extreme jihadi groups became starkly evident in late
2013. On December 6, armed fighters from Ahrar al-Sham and other militias
raided warehouses at Bab al-Hawa, on the Turkish border, and seized supplies
belonging to the Free Syrian Army. As it happened, a meeting of an
international coordination group on Syria, the so-called London Eleven, was
scheduled for the following week. Delegates from the United States, Europe, and
the Middle East were bent on issuing a stern condemnation of the offending
jihadi group.
The Turks
and Qataris, however, adamantly refused to sign on. As one of the participants
told me later, “All the countries in the room [understood] that Turkey’s
opposition to listing Ahrar al-Sham was because they were providing support to
them.” The Qatari representative insisted that it was counterproductive to
condemn such groups as terrorist. If the other countries did so, he made clear,
Qatar would stop cooperating on Syria. “Basically, they were saying that if you
name terrorists, we’re going to pick up our ball and go home,” the source told
me.
The U.S. delegate said that the Islamic Front, an umbrella organization,
would be welcome at the negotiating table — but Ahrar al-Sham, which
happened to be its leading member, would not. The diplomats mulled over their
communiqué, traded concessions, adjusted language. The final version contained
no condemnation, or even mention, of Ahrar al-Sham.
Cockburn’s
piece underscores the seemingly obvious point that there is a contradiction
between the U.S. government’s supposed war on terror and its backing of such
forces.
The Syrian
war alone has killed nearly a quarter of a million people. According to a report [6] released by the United
Nations this summer, one out of every 122 people on the planet has been
forcibly displaced by war and persecution.
Meanwhile, many from within the
region have argued that, in the wake of the Arab Spring, the U.S. and allies
like Saudi Arabia played a profoundly counter-revolutionary force against
grassroots movements seeking real, democratic alternatives to authoritarian
regimes.
In the past
year and a half, ISIS has expanded [7] to
over 20 countries. The Global Terrorism Index [8], produced
by the Institute for Economics and Peace, estimates that global terrorist
incidents have significantly increased since the U.S. war on terror began.
As
Iraqi-American activist Dahlia Wasfi told AlterNet over the phone, "The
people who live in these countries that the U.S. has determined will be the
battlefield—those are the people who are suffering.”
If the
dealings Cockburn highlights in his report stem from well-thought-out and
calculated policies, they are extremely dangerous. If they are merely the
product of incoherence, we are already seeing who pays the price.
Sarah
Lazare is a staff writer for AlterNet. A former staff writer for Common
Dreams, Sarah co-edited the book About Face: Military Resisters Turn Against
War. Follow her on Twitter at @sarahlazare [9].
[11]
Links:
[1] http://www.alternet.org/authors/sarah-lazare-0
[2] http://alternet.org
[3] http://airwars.org/daily-reports/
[4] https://harpers.org/archive/2016/01/a-special-relationship/?single=1
[5] http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2015/06/15/why-we-need-al-qaeda/
[6] http://unhcr.org/556725e69.html#_ga=1.225701913.2095888809.1417795315
[7] http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/17/world/mapping-isis-attacks-around-the-world/
[8] http://economicsandpeace.org/research/iep-indices-data/global-terrorism-index
[9] https://twitter.com/sarahlazare
[10] mailto:corrections@alternet.org?Subject=Typo on Major Investigation Reveals Disturbing Connection Between U.S. Intelligence and Al Qaeda Since 9/11
[11] http://www.alternet.org/
[12] http://www.alternet.org/%2Bnew_src%2B
[2] http://alternet.org
[3] http://airwars.org/daily-reports/
[4] https://harpers.org/archive/2016/01/a-special-relationship/?single=1
[5] http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2015/06/15/why-we-need-al-qaeda/
[6] http://unhcr.org/556725e69.html#_ga=1.225701913.2095888809.1417795315
[7] http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/17/world/mapping-isis-attacks-around-the-world/
[8] http://economicsandpeace.org/research/iep-indices-data/global-terrorism-index
[9] https://twitter.com/sarahlazare
[10] mailto:corrections@alternet.org?Subject=Typo on Major Investigation Reveals Disturbing Connection Between U.S. Intelligence and Al Qaeda Since 9/11
[11] http://www.alternet.org/
[12] http://www.alternet.org/%2Bnew_src%2B
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"The master class
has always declared the wars; the subject class has always fought the battles.
The master class has had all to gain and nothing to lose, while the subject
class has had nothing to gain and everything to lose--especially their lives."
Eugene Victor Debs
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