Published on Portside (https://portside.org)
The Desperate Plight of Petro-States - With a Busted Business
Model, Oil Economies Head for the Unknown
June 2, 2016
Michael T. Klare
Thursday, May 26, 2016
Tom Dispatch
Pity the poor petro-states. Once so
wealthy from oil sales that they could finance wars, mega-projects, and
domestic social peace simultaneously, some of them are now beset by internal
strife or are on the brink of collapse as oil prices remain at ruinously low
levels. Unlike other countries, which largely finance their governments through
taxation, petro-states rely on their oil and natural gas revenues. Russia, for
example, obtains about 50% [1] of government income
that way; Nigeria, 60% [2]; and Saudi Arabia, a
whopping 90% [3]. When oil was selling at
$100 per barrel or above, as was the case until 2014, these countries could
finance lavish government projects and social welfare operations, ensuring
widespread popular support. Now, with oil below $50 and likely to persist
at that level, they find themselves curbing public spending and fending off
rising domestic discontent or even incipient revolt.
At the peak of their glory, the
petro-states played an outsized role in world affairs. The members of
OPEC, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, earned [4] an estimated $821
billion from oil exports in 2013 alone. Flush with cash, they were able to
exert influence over other countries through a wide variety of aid and
patronage operations. Venezuela, for example, sought to counter U.S. influence
in Latin America via its Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA [5]), a
cooperative network of mostly leftist governments. Saudi Arabia spread its
influence throughout the Islamic world in part by financing [6] the
efforts of its ultra-conservative Wahhabi clergy to establish madrassas
(religious academies) throughout the Islamic world. Russia, under Vladimir
Putin, used its prodigious oil wealth to rebuild [7] and refurbish its
military, which had largely disintegrated following the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Lesser members of the petro-state club like Angola, Azerbaijan, and
Kazakhstan became accustomed to regular fawning visits from the presidents and
prime ministers of major oil-importing countries.
That, of course, was then, and this
is now. While these countries still matter, what worries these presidents and
prime ministers now is the growing likelihood of civil violence or even state
collapse. Take, for example, Venezuela, long an ardent foe of U.S. policy in
Latin America, but today the potential site of a future bloody civil war [8] between
supporters and opponents of the current government. Similar kinds of internal
strife and civil disorder are likely in oil-producing states like Algeria and
Nigeria, where the potential for the further growth of terrorist violence amid
chaos is always high.
Some petro-states like Venezuela
and Iraq already appear to be edging up to the brink of collapse. Others like
Russia and Saudi Arabia will be forced to reorient their economies if they hope
to avoid such future outcomes. Whatever their degree of risk, all of them are
already experiencing [9] economic
hardship, leaving their leaders under growing pressure to somehow alter course
in the bleakest of circumstances -- or face the consequences.
A Busted Business Model
Petro-states are different from
other countries because the fates of their governing institutions are so deeply
woven into the boom-and-bust cycles [10] of
the international petroleum economy. The challenges they face are only
compounded by the unnaturally close ties [11] between
their political leaderships and senior officials of their state-owned or
state-controlled oil and natural gas industries. Historically, their rulers
have placed close allies or even family members in key industry positions,
ensuring continuing government control and in many cases personal enrichment as
well. In Russia, for example, the management of Gazprom, the state-controlled
natural gas company, and Rosneft, the state-owned oil company, is almost indistinguishable [12] from
the senior leadership in the Kremlin, with both groups answering to President
Putin. A similar pattern holds for Venezuela, where the government keeps the
state-owned company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), on a tight leash,
and in Saudi Arabia, where the royal family oversees the operations of the
state-owned Saudi Aramco.
In 2016, one thing is finally
clear, however: the business model for these corporatized states is busted. The
most basic assumption behind their operation -- that global oil demand will
continue to outpace world petroleum supplies and ensure high prices into the
foreseeable future -- no longer holds. Instead, in what for any petro-state
is a nightmarish, upside-down version of that model, supply, not demand, is
forging ahead, leaving the market flooded with fossil fuels.
Most analysts, including those at
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), now believe [13] that increases in energy
efficiency, the spread of affordable alternative energy sources (especially
wind and solar), slowing worldwide economic growth, and concern over climate change
will continue to put a damper on fossil fuel demand in the years ahead.
Meanwhile, the oil industry -- now equipped with fracking technology and
other advanced extractive techniques -- will continue to boost supplies. It's a
formula for keeping prices low. In fact, a growing number of analysts are
convinced that world oil demand will in the not-so-distant future reach
a peak [14] and begin a long-term decline, ensuring that large reserves
of petroleum will be left in the ground. For the petro-states, all of this
means persistent pain unless they can find a new business model that is somehow
predicated on a permanent low-oil-price environment.
These states vary in both their
willingness and ability to respond to this new reality effectively. Some are
too deeply committed to their existing business model (and its associated
leadership system) to consider significant changes; others, increasingly aware
of the need to do something, find almost insuperable structural roadblocks in
the way; and a third group, recognizing the desperate need for change, is
attempting a total economic overhaul of its oil economies. In recent weeks,
examples of all three types - Venezuela for the first, Nigeria the second, and
Saudi Arabia the third -- have surfaced in the news.
Venezuela: A Nation on the Brink
Venezuela claims the world's
largest proven reserves of petroleum, an estimated 298 billion barrels [15] of
oil. In past decades, the exploitation of this vast fossil fuel patrimony has
ensured incredible wealth for foreign companies and Venezuelan elites alike.
After assuming the presidency in 1999, however, Hugo Chávez sought to channel
the bulk of this wealth to Venezuela's poor and working classes by forcing
foreign firms to partner with the state-owned oil firm PdVSA and redirecting
that company's profits to government spending programs. Billions of dollars
were funneled into state-directed "missions" [16] to
the poor, lifting millions of Venezuelans out of poverty. In 2002, when the
company's long-serving managers rebelled [17] against
these moves, Chávez simply replaced them with his own party loyalists and the
diversion of funds continued.
In the wake of the ousting of that
original management team, the country's oil production began to decline.
With prices running at or above $100 per barrel, this initially seemed to
make little difference as money continued to pour into government coffers and
those missions to the poor kept right on going. What Chavez didn't do, however,
was create the national equivalent of a rainy-day fund. Little of the oil
money was channeled into a sovereign wealth fund for more problematic moments,
nor was any invested in other kinds of industries that might in time have
generated streams of non-fossil-fuel income for the government.
As a result, when prices began to
drop in the fall of 2014, Chavez's presidential successor, Nicolás Maduro,
faced a triple calamity: diminished revenues for social services, scant savings
to draw upon, and no alternative sources of income. Not surprisingly, as a new
impoverishment spread, many former Chavistas lost faith in the regime and, in
last December's parliamentary elections, voted for [18] emboldened
opposition candidates.
Today, Venezuela is a nation living
under an officially declared "state of emergency," politically riven,
experiencing food riots [19] and
other violence, and possibly on the brink of collapse [20]. According
to the IMF, the economy contracted [13] by 5.7% in 2015 and is
expected to diminish by another 8% this year -- more, that is, than any other
country on the planet. Inflation is out of control, unemployment and crime are
soaring, and what little money Venezuela had in its rainy-day account has
largely been spent. Only China has been willing to lend it money to pay off its
debts. If Beijing chooses [21] to hold back when the
next payments come due this fall, the country could face default. Opposition
leaders in the National Assembly seek to oust [22] Maduro and move ahead
with various reforms, but the government is using its control of the courts
to block [23] such efforts, and the
nation remains in a state of paralysis.
Nigeria: Continuing Disorder
Nigeria possesses [2] the
largest oil and natural gas reserves in sub-Saharan Africa. The exploitation of
those reserves has long proved immensely profitable for foreign companies like
Royal Dutch Shell and Chevron and also for well-connected Nigerian elites.
Very little of this wealth, however, has trickled down to those living in
the Niger Delta region in the south of the country where most of the oil and
gas is produced. Opposition to the central government in Abuja, the capital, to
which the oil income flows, has long been strong in the Delta, leading to
periodic outbursts of violence. Successive federal administrations have
promised a more equitable allocation of oil revenues, but a promise this has
remained.
From 2006 to 2009, Nigeria was
wracked by an insurgency spearheaded by the Movement for the Emancipation of
the Niger Delta, a militant group [24] seeking
to redirect oil revenues to the country's impoverished southern states.
In 2009, when President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua offered the militants an
amnesty and monthly cash payments, the insurgency died down. His
successor, Goodluck Jonathan, a southerner, promised to respect the amnesty and
channel more funds to the region.
For a while, high oil prices
enabled Jonathan to make good on some of his promises, even as entrenched
elites in Abuja continued to pocket a substantial percentage of the country's
petroleum income. When prices began to plummet, however, he was confronted with
mounting challenges. Pervasive corruption [25] turned
people against the government, feeding recruits into Boko Haram, the terror
movement then growing in the country's northern reaches; money intended for
soldiers in the Nigerian army disappeared [26] into
the pockets of military elites, subverting efforts to fight the insurgents. In
national elections held a year ago, Muhammadu Buhari, a former general who
vowed to crack down on corruption, rescue the economy, and defeat Boko
Haram, took the presidency [27] from
Jonathan.
Since assuming office, Buhari has
demonstrated a grasp of Nigeria's structural weaknesses, especially its
overwhelming dependency on oil monies, along with a determination to overcome
them. As promised, he has launched a serious crackdown on the sort of
corruption that is a commonplace feature of petro-states, firing officials
accused of blatant thievery. At the same time, he has stepped up military
pressure on Boko Haram, for the first time putting a crimp in that group's
brutal activities. Crucially, he has announced plans to diversify [28] the
economy, placing more emphasis on agriculture and non-fossil-fuel-related
industries, which might, if pursued seriously, help diminish Nigeria's
increasingly disastrous reliance on oil.
In the cold light of day, however,
the country still needs those oil revenues for the lion's share of its income,
which means that in the current low-price environment it has ever less money to
fight Boko Haram, pay for social services, or pursue alternative investment
schemes. In addition, Buhari has been accused of disproportionately targeting [29] southerners
in his fight against corruption, sparking not just fresh discontent in the
Delta region but the rise of a new militant group -- the Niger Delta Avengers
-- that poses a threat to oil production. On May 4th, the Avengers attacked [30] an
offshore oil platform operated by Chevron and the Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation, forcing the companies to shut down production of about 90,000
barrels per day. Add that to other insurgent attacks on the country's oil
infrastructure and the Nigerian government is expected to lose $1 billion in
May alone. If repairs are not completed on time, it may lose an equal
amount in June. It remains a nation on edge, in danger of devastating
impoverishment, and with few genuine alternatives available.
Saudi Arabia: Seeking a New Vision
With the world's second largest [15] reserves
of oil, Saudi Arabia is also the planet's leading producer, pumping out a
staggering 10.2 million barrels daily. Originally, those massive energy
reserves were owned by a consortium of American companies operating under the
umbrella of the Arabian-American Oil Company [31] (Aramco).
In the 1970s, however, Aramco [32] was nationalized and
is now owned by the Saudi state -- which is to say, the Saudi monarchy. Today,
it is the world's most valuable company, worth by some estimates as much
as $10 trillion [33] (10
times more than Apple), and so a source of almost unimaginable wealth for the
Saudi royal family.
For decades, the country's
leadership pursued [34] a consistent
political-economic business plan: sell as much oil as possible and use the
proceeds to enrich the numerous princes and princesses of the realm; provide
lavish social benefits to the rest of the population, thereby averting popular
unrest of the "Arab Spring" variety; finance the ultra-conservative
Wahhabi clergy so as to ensure its loyalty to the regime; finance like-minded
states in the region; and put aside money for those rainy-day periods of low
oil prices.
Saudi leaders have recently come to
recognize that this plan is no longer sustainable. In 2016, the Saudi budget
has, for the first time in recent memory, moved into deficit territory and the monarchy
has had to cut back [3] on
both its usual subsidies to and social programs for its people. Unlike the
Venezuelans or the Nigerians, the Saudi royals socked away enough money in the
country's sovereign wealth fund to cover deficit spending for at least a couple
of years. It is now, however, burning through those funds at a prodigious rate,
in part to finance a brutal and futile war [35] in
Yemen. At some point, it will have to sharply curtail government spending.
Given the youthfulness of the Saudi population -- 70% of its citizens are under
30 -- and its long dependence on government handouts, such moves could, in the
view of many analysts, lead to widespread civil unrest.
Historically, Saudi leaders have
been slow to initiate change. But recently, the royal family has defied
expectations, taking radical steps to prepare the country for a transition to
what's being termed a post-petroleum economy. On April 25th, the powerful
Deputy Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, unveiled [36] "Saudi
Vision 2030," a somewhat hazy blueprint for the kingdom's economic
diversification and modernization. Prince Mohammed also indicated that the
country will soon begin to offer [36] public shares in Saudi
Aramco, with the intention of raising massive funds to invest in and create
non-oil-related Saudi industries and revenue streams. On May 7th, the monarchy
also abruptly dismissed [37] its
long-serving oil minister, Ali al-Naimi, and replaced him with the head of
Saudi Aramco, Khalid al-Falih, a figure deemed [38] more subservient to
Prince Mohammed. Falih's job title was also changed to minister of energy,
industry, and mineral resources, which was (so the experts speculated [39]) a signal
from the monarchy of its determination to move beyond exclusive reliance on oil
as a source of income.
This is all so unprecedented that
there is no way of predicting whether the Saudi royals are actually capable of
bringing anything like Saudi Vision 2030 to fruition, no less moving away in a
serious fashion from its reliance on oil. Many obstacles remain, including the
possibility that jealous royals will push Prince Mohammed (and his vision)
aside when his father, King Salman, now 80, passes from the scene. (There are
regular rumors that some members of the royal family resent [40] the meteoric rise of
the 31-year-old prince.) Nevertheless, his dramatic statements about the need
to diversify the kingdom's economy do show that even Saudi Arabia -- the
petro-state par excellence -- now recognizes that some kind of new identity is
now a necessity.
The Stakes for Us All
You may not live in a petro-state,
but that doesn't mean you don't have a stake in the evolution of this unique
political life form. From at least the "oil shock" of 1973, when the
Arab OPEC members announced an "oil boycott" against the U.S. for its
involvement in the Yom Kippur War, such countries have played an outsized role
on the world stage, distorting international relations, and -- in the Greater
Middle East -- involving themselves (and their financial resources) in one
conflict after another from the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 to the wars in Yemen
and Syria today.
Their fervent support for and
financing of favored causes -- whether it be Wahhabism and associated jihadist
groups (Saudi Arabia), anti-Westernism (Russia), or the survival of the Assad
regime in Syria (Iran) -- has provoked widespread disorder and misery. It will
hardly be a tragedy if a lack of funds forces such states to pull back from
efforts of this sort. But given the centrality of fossil fuels to our world for
the last century or more, the chaos that could ensue in the oil heartlands of
the planet from low oil prices and high supply is likely to create
unpredictable new nightmares of its own.
And the greatest nightmares of all
lurk not in any of this but in the inability of these states and those they
supply to liberate themselves from reliance on fossil fuels fast enough.
Looking into the future, the demise of petro-states as we've known them
could have a profound impact on the struggle to avert catastrophic climate
change. Although these states are not primarily responsible for the actual
combustion of fossil fuels -- that's something we in the oil-importing
countries must take responsibility for -- their pivotal role in fueling the global
petroleum economy has made them largely resistant to international efforts to
curb emissions of carbon dioxide. As they try to repair their busted business
model or collapse under the weight of its failures, we can only hope that the
path they follow will entail significantly less dependence on oil exports as
well as a determination to speed up the conclusion of the fossil fuel era and
so diminish its legacy of climate disaster.
[Michael T. Klare, a TomDispatch [41] regular [41], is a
professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and the
author, most recently, of The Race for What's Left [42]. A
documentary movie version of his book Blood and Oil is available from the Media
Education Foundation. Follow him on Twitter at @mklare1.]
Follow TomDispatch on Twitter [43] and
join us on Facebook [44]. Check out
the newest Dispatch Book, Nick Turse's Next Time They'll Come to Count the Dead [45], and Tom
Engelhardt's latest book, Shadow Government: Surveillance, Secret Wars, and a Global
Security State in a Single-Superpower World [46].
Copyright 2016 Michael T. Klare.
Reprinted with permission [47]. May not
be reprinted without permission from TomDispatch [48].
Links:
[1] https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=RUS
[2] https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=NGA
[3] http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/17/world/middleeast/young-saudis-see-cushy-jobs-vanish-along-with-nations-oil-wealth.html
[4] http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=19231
[5] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ALBA
[6] http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/analyses/madrassas.html
[7] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/syria-shows-that-russia-built-an-effective-military-now-how-will-putin-use-it/2016/03/17/aeaca59e-eae8-11e5-a9ce-681055c7a05f_story.html
[8] http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/697f928a-fa77-11e5-8f41-df5bda8beb40.html
[9] https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/dec/30/oil-iran-saudi-arabia-russia-venezuela-nigeria-libya
[10] http://www.amazon.com/Paradox-Plenty-Petro-States-International-Political/dp/0520207726
[11] http://www.amazon.com/dp/0691159637/ref=nosim/?tag=tomdispatch-20
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[13] http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/
[14] http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/176134/
[15] http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html
[16] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bolivarian_missions
[17] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venezuelan_general_strike_of_2002%E2%80%930
[18] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/07/venezuela-elections-socialists-dealt-a-blow-as-opposition-wins-landslide
[19] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/20/venezuela-breaking-point-food-shortages-protests-maduro
[20] http://time.com/4342329/venezuela-economic-collapse-nicolas-maduro/
[21] http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/17/opinion/venezuelas-downward-spiral.html
[22] http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/03/29/Venezuelan-opposition-preparing-referendum-to-oust-Maduro/7201459269012/
[23] http://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-idUSKCN0XM2BD
[24] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Movement_for_the_Emancipation_of_the_Niger_Delta
[25] http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21689905-most-nigerians-live-poverty-millions-would-be-spared-if-officials-stopped
[26] http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/12/27/461038854/did-corruption-in-nigeria-hamper-its-fight-against-boko-haram
[27] http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/world/africa/nigeria-election-muhammadu-buhari-goodluck-jonathan.html
[28] http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/10/buhari-plans-diversification-of-nigerias-economy-in-2016-budget/
[29] http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/001fabc6-13af-11e6-91da-096d89bd2173.html
[30] http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-06/nigerian-oil-output-plunges-to-20-year-low-as-attacks-escalate
[31] http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3424600273.html
[32] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saudi_Aramco
[33] http://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-aramco-confirms-ipo-study-1452254819
[34] http://www.amazon.com/dp/0786106433/ref=nosim/?tag=tomdispatch-20
[35] https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/helen-lackner/can-saudi-led-coalition-win-war-in-yemen
[36] http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/26/world/middleeast/saudi-prince-shares-planto-cut-oil-dependency-and-energize-the-economy.html
[37] http://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabias-powerful-oil-minister-ali-al-naimi-is-fired-1462632035
[38] http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/eba73104-1490-11e6-b197-a4af20d5575e.html
[39] https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2016/05/07/tension-rising-saudi-monarch-ousts-ministers/CamPk3bVYdFWqEum2HA6mI/story.html
[40] http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/saudi-arabia-succession-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salman-could-destabilise-middle-east-1538412
[41] http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/176134/tomgram%3A_michael_klare%2C_the_coming_world_of_%22peak_oil_demand%2C%22_not_%22peak_oil%22/
[42] http://www.amazon.com/dp/1250023971/ref=nosim/?tag=tomdispatch-20
[43] https://twitter.com/TomDispatch
[44] http://www.facebook.com/tomdispatch
[45] http://www.amazon.com/dp/1608466485/ref=nosim/?tag=tomdispatch-20
[46] http://www.amazon.com/dp/1608463656/ref=nosim/?tag=tomdispatch-20
[47] mailto:tomeditor@aol.com
[48] http://www.tomdispatch.com/
[2] https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=NGA
[3] http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/17/world/middleeast/young-saudis-see-cushy-jobs-vanish-along-with-nations-oil-wealth.html
[4] http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=19231
[5] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ALBA
[6] http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/analyses/madrassas.html
[7] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/syria-shows-that-russia-built-an-effective-military-now-how-will-putin-use-it/2016/03/17/aeaca59e-eae8-11e5-a9ce-681055c7a05f_story.html
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[10] http://www.amazon.com/Paradox-Plenty-Petro-States-International-Political/dp/0520207726
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[15] http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html
[16] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bolivarian_missions
[17] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venezuelan_general_strike_of_2002%E2%80%930
[18] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/07/venezuela-elections-socialists-dealt-a-blow-as-opposition-wins-landslide
[19] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/20/venezuela-breaking-point-food-shortages-protests-maduro
[20] http://time.com/4342329/venezuela-economic-collapse-nicolas-maduro/
[21] http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/17/opinion/venezuelas-downward-spiral.html
[22] http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/03/29/Venezuelan-opposition-preparing-referendum-to-oust-Maduro/7201459269012/
[23] http://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-idUSKCN0XM2BD
[24] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Movement_for_the_Emancipation_of_the_Niger_Delta
[25] http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21689905-most-nigerians-live-poverty-millions-would-be-spared-if-officials-stopped
[26] http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/12/27/461038854/did-corruption-in-nigeria-hamper-its-fight-against-boko-haram
[27] http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/world/africa/nigeria-election-muhammadu-buhari-goodluck-jonathan.html
[28] http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/10/buhari-plans-diversification-of-nigerias-economy-in-2016-budget/
[29] http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/001fabc6-13af-11e6-91da-096d89bd2173.html
[30] http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-06/nigerian-oil-output-plunges-to-20-year-low-as-attacks-escalate
[31] http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3424600273.html
[32] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saudi_Aramco
[33] http://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-aramco-confirms-ipo-study-1452254819
[34] http://www.amazon.com/dp/0786106433/ref=nosim/?tag=tomdispatch-20
[35] https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/helen-lackner/can-saudi-led-coalition-win-war-in-yemen
[36] http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/26/world/middleeast/saudi-prince-shares-planto-cut-oil-dependency-and-energize-the-economy.html
[37] http://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabias-powerful-oil-minister-ali-al-naimi-is-fired-1462632035
[38] http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/eba73104-1490-11e6-b197-a4af20d5575e.html
[39] https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2016/05/07/tension-rising-saudi-monarch-ousts-ministers/CamPk3bVYdFWqEum2HA6mI/story.html
[40] http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/saudi-arabia-succession-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salman-could-destabilise-middle-east-1538412
[41] http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/176134/tomgram%3A_michael_klare%2C_the_coming_world_of_%22peak_oil_demand%2C%22_not_%22peak_oil%22/
[42] http://www.amazon.com/dp/1250023971/ref=nosim/?tag=tomdispatch-20
[43] https://twitter.com/TomDispatch
[44] http://www.facebook.com/tomdispatch
[45] http://www.amazon.com/dp/1608466485/ref=nosim/?tag=tomdispatch-20
[46] http://www.amazon.com/dp/1608463656/ref=nosim/?tag=tomdispatch-20
[47] mailto:tomeditor@aol.com
[48] http://www.tomdispatch.com/
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