Published on Portside (https://portside.org)
How the Iran Deal Could Reshape the Middle East
Benjamin Tua
Tuesday, August 11, 2015
Foreign Policy in Focus
The profound changes occurring in the Middle East have led to exaggerated
estimates of a decline of U.S. influence in the Middle East.
There is a sense that the U.S. ability to “call the shots” has been
diminished, and concern that the United States is likely to withdraw from the
region. In fact, the U.S. standing is likely to increase as Washington
repositions itself.
This shift in U.S. policy has been signaled by statements over a period of
years by senior active and former U.S. officials.
During 2010 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, for
example, then Central Command chief General David Petraeus remarked on the
damage to U.S. interests generated by “insufficient progress towards a
comprehensive Middle East peace.” Petraeus said that the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict foments anti-American sentiment. He added that Arab anger over the
Palestinian question limits partnerships with governments and peoples in the
region, weakens the legitimacy of moderate regimes in the Arab world, allows
militant groups to exploit that anger to mobilize support, and gives Iran
influence in the Arab world through its clients.
More recently, senior officials have explicitly acknowledged that the
situation in the Middle East is deteriorating and have stressed that a course
correction by Washington is in order. Former Joint Chiefs of Staff head Admiral
Mike Mullen recently argued that Washington needs to re-examine all its
relationships in the Middle East, primarily with Sunni-dominated countries, and
that a rapprochement with Iran will better balance U.S. diplomacy in the
region.
The Big Move
Nothing better exemplifies the shift in the U.S. approach to the region and
its ability to adjust to changing circumstances than the conclusion on July 14
of the nuclear agreement between the five permanent members of the UN Security
Council (Russia, China, France, the UK, and the United States) and Germany (P5
plus 1) on one side and Iran on the other. On the day that the agreement,
formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was
announced, Senator Dianne Feinstein observed that “we’re in a deteriorating
situation in the Middle East, and this [agreement] offers the opportunity to
turn the page.”
In the days immediately preceding and following the conclusion of the
nuclear agreement, both the United States and, to some degree, Iran emphasized
its narrow nature and the intractable character of the many differences between
the two countries. Soon, however, both sides began to speak of possibilities
for more cooperative relationships in the region.
President Obama has indicated that the region needs a new approach and
attitude toward regional security. He said the Sunni Arab states shouldn’t
blame Iran for all their problems, and he called on them to engage Iran in a
“practical conversation” to reduce sectarian divisions and address shared
threats from terrorism. At the same time, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif
talked about the possibilities for cooperation on common challenges with Iran’s
neighbors in a spirit of “mutual respect, good neighborliness, and Islamic
brotherhood.”
In fact, this agreement is a major marker in the transformation of the
Middle East. And it has opened the way to major realignments of power relationships
in the region in coming years.
Change and Detente
The agreement on the nuclear issue will ease tensions between the United
States and Iran. It will generate a more favorable climate for bilateral and
multilateral agreements on a range of other issues in the broader Middle East.
This will lead to major changes in the relations among the various Middle
Eastern states, which will contribute to stability from Afghanistan to the
Mediterranean. Beyond facilitating cooperation between Iran and the so-called
moderate Arab monarchies, it also could well bring Iran and the Israelis
closer.
As Iran becomes a major center of gravity in the region, neither the
Israelis nor the Arabs will want to be the odd man out. Aside from public
rhetoric, both see the handwriting on the wall, and national leaders are
calculating how to deal with the evolving situation. They will adjust and, in
some instances, seize the initiative with accommodations among themselves and
Iran.
As a result, the area will exhibit greater stability, and U.S. influence
will increase as Washington pursues its policy objectives in a more balanced
way.
In the near term, the U.S. policy shift provides an obvious opportunity for
the Arab states to work with Iran to defeat the Islamic State and to achieve a
political solution to the conflicts in Syria and Yemen.
Saudi Accommodation and Israeli Resistance
Despite considerable unease, Saudi Arabia accepted that a deal on the
nuclear issue was likely and has begun to adjust to the new reality.
In May 2014, in a move seen as an effort to ease relations, then Saudi
Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal said that the kingdom was prepared to host
Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif “anytime he sees fit.” The Iranians quickly
welcomed the invitation, and this past January Zarif flew to Riyadh to pay his
respects to late Saudi King Abdullah.
After the nuclear agreement was announced, the United Arab Emirates and
Kuwait both congratulated Iran. Saudi Arabia’s King Salman reacted cautiously,
telling President Obama that he hoped it would strengthen “stability and
security” in the region. Subsequently, the Saudi foreign minister “reaffirmed”
Saudi Arabia’s support for the agreement.
For their part, Israeli political leaders have continued stridently to
voice their suspicions of Iran and to publicly denounce the July 14 agreement.
If anything, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s rhetoric has escalated since
the announcement of the nuclear deal. Opposition leaders have joined the ruling
coalition in criticizing the agreement. However, as early as December 2013,
then Israeli President Shimon Peres said that he could be willing to meet with
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and that the Jewish state should be open to
the prospect of achieving a final, long-lasting deal.
At the same time, senior former Israeli security and intelligence officials
have been less alarmist than their political leaders. Former Israel Atomic
Energy Commission Brigadier General Uzi Eilam, for example, told the Israeli
paper Yediot Ahronoth in May 2014 that the Iranian nuclear program would
only be operational in another decade. He added that he was not sure that Iran
wants the bomb and suggested that Netanyahu was employing needless
fear-mongering about Iran’s atomic aspirations. Former Israeli intelligence
chief Efraim Halevy, who was appointed by Netanyahu, said on July 31 that the
United States scored a great success in putting together a broad coalition to
negotiate with Iran and face down the Iranian nuclear threat. And Israeli
Defense Minister Moshe Yaalon simply hedged that Israel will need to analyze
the effect the agreement will have on its security.
Longer-Term Implications
Netanyahu’s position surely reflects a calculation that a rapprochement
between Tehran and Washington will ultimately result in a broader understanding
between Iran and the United States that will both reduce Sunni-Shia tensions in
the region and Israel’s influence in Washington.
In fact, the potential benefits for Israel are considerable, and the
realignments could lead to Israel’s integration within the region. Absent a
shift in Israeli policy, the country will face mounting pressure to accede to
regional and international support for a Palestinian state. As the Arabs and
the Iranians find a more productive modus vivendi, and the Palestinians
continue their slow walk to near universal recognition and ultimately statehood
via non-violent resistance and international law, Israel will be compelled to
adjust to the new realities.
Given the erosion in support for current Israeli policies in Europe and, to
some extent, in the United States, Israel should accept what is increasingly
inevitable and negotiate a final status agreement with the Palestinians, which
produces a Palestinian state roughly along the pre-Six Day War lines. An
agreement that is acceptable to both sides, as well as the states in the region
and beyond, could finally facilitate Israel’s integration into the region.
For its integration to be complete and secure, Israel also must be more
open about its own nuclear weapons program — the region’s only one. This would
include acceptance of international inspectors at its nuclear facility in the
Negev and other relevant sites. Additional positive results could include an
eventual agreement on a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone and a marked
strengthening of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, making it
even less attractive for states within and beyond the region to seek to become
nuclear weapons threshold states.
Of course, the other players — especially the permanent members of the UN
Security Council — also must do their part. And the United States will be well
positioned to provide incentives and orchestrate efforts by all interested
parties that will contribute to stability and facilitate development in the
region. Washington will undoubtedly step up its efforts to seek understandings
between Tehran and the Arab states to wind down the sectarian and tribal
conflicts in the region. It could also encourage Iran to tone down its
anti-Israel rhetoric. For progress, Iran will have to signal Israel that it
remains prepared to accept a resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
that is acceptable to both sides, and that it will do its part to reduce the
hostility between Israel and itself.
A good place for the players to initiate gestures of this kind would be at
the opening this fall of the 70th UN General Assembly session. Pope
Francis’s address to the assembled representatives will, at a minimum,
contribute to the spirit of new beginnings and could well help make the session
more productive than those of recent years.
Benjamin Tua, a retired Foreign Service Officer, served in Israel, the
former Soviet Union, Brazil, Italy, Japan, and southern Africa.
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