Diego Garcia: A Thorn In The Side Of
Weapon-Free Zone
Peter H. Sand
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
8 October 2009
Article Highlights
More than 13 years after its signature, the Pelindaba
Treaty, which establishes
free zone, officially came into force this summer.
However, conflicting British and African interpretations
of an oblique footnote about Diego Garcia threaten to
put one signatory,
For
this ambiguity must be clarified--possibly affecting
On July 15, the Pelindaba Treaty, which established
into force. The treaty is the latest regional agreement
to ban nuclear weapons in its area of application. The
other five are the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the 1967
Treaty of Tlatelolco (for
Caribbean), the 1985 Treaty of
Pacific), the 1995 Treaty of
Asia), and the 2006 Treaty of
The Pelindaba Treaty--named for the former South African
nuclear weapons facility near
party "to prohibit in its territory the stationing of
any nuclear explosive devices," while allowing parties
to authorize visits or transits by foreign nuclear-armed
ships or aircraft. It also prohibits nuclear weapon
tests and radioactive waste dumping. Two supplementary
protocols to the treaty provide for non-African nuclear
powers to agree that they won't "contribute to any act
which constitutes a violation of this treaty or
protocol." The
protocols under the
after a heated political debate,
submit them to the Senate for ratification.
France, and Britain have ratified them, however,
ostensibly supporting the International Atomic Energy
Agency's enthusiastic (if slightly exaggerated) claim
that the treaty made the "entire Southern hemisphere
free of nuclear weapons."
Underneath this international support for an African
nuclear-weapon-free zone, however, is a low-profile but
high-stakes dispute over the status of the Chagos
Archipelago, which includes Diego Garcia. This coral
atoll in the
be the site of one of the most valuable (and secretive)
claim sovereignty over the archipelago.
According to the map appended to the Pelindaba Treaty,
the nuclear-weapon-free zone explicitly covers the
"Chagos Archipelago--Diego Garcia," albeit with a
footnote (inserted at the British government's request)
stating that the territory "appears without prejudice to
the question of sovereignty." (To read more about the
negotiations that led to the ominous Diego Garcia
footnote, see the U.N. Institute for Disarmament
Research publication, "The Treaty of Pelindaba on the
African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone.") Although all of the
participating African countries agreed that the Chagos
Islands should be included in the treaty parameters, the
British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) did not,
stating that it had no doubt as to its sovereignty over
the
protocols noted that it did "not accept the inclusion of
[the
free zone" without consent of the British government.
While
because of the ambiguity created by that unilateral
statement,
supported by the
representative of the
Agency explaining that it was adequate to "protect
interests because any resolution of the [sovereignty]
issue will occur outside the framework of the treaty."
But what are the
this sovereignty debate have to do with
nuclear-weapon-free zone? In the last 40 or so years,
thanks to a series of U.S.-British bilateral agreements
(some of them secret), the expulsion of the atoll's
indigenous population between 1967 and 1973, and a $2.5
billion
has developed into a robust naval support facility,
satellite tracking station, and bomber forward-operating
location. It played a central role in all offensive
combat missions against
to 2006 and was used as a staging area for 20 B-52
bombers prominently deployed as a "calculated-ambiguous"
tactical nuclear deterrent against any possible chemical
or biological weapons used by
The Diego Garcia internal lagoon--a gigantic natural
harbor, measuring 48 square miles and dredged to a depth
of 40 feet as a turning basin for aircraft carriers and
nuclear submarines--is currently being upgraded to
accommodate the
missile attack submarines. Considering the base's
strategic location, current
East and Central Asia, and what is known about past uses
of the base, it would be irresponsible to rule out the
potential for nuclear weapons at Diego Garcia.
That the
be adequate protection against the "bite" of the treaty
protocols may have been overly confident. Now that the
treaty has entered into force,
legally bound by its provisions--though the British FCO
would vehemently disagree, citing the footnote as
disclaimer. A recent editorial in the
called on the government to broaden its ongoing
bilateral negotiations (which will resume in
October) with the FCO on the Chagos Archipelago to
include
President Barack Obama's
toward making Diego Garcia nuclear-weapon-free. Until
that time, in the eyes of
African signatories to the Pelindaba Treaty,
will not be able to meet its treaty obligations.
One key to these talks may be the precedent of the 1959
Antarctic Treaty, which also contains a disclaimer for
sovereignty issues. Thus far, nobody has interpreted
this disclaimer as excluding the British Antarctic
Territory from the geographic scope of that treaty. As
such,
inconvenient internal contradictions lurking in the wake
of the Pelindaba Treaty. To the embarrassment of the
FCO, the Diego Garcia base also has been confirmed by
the CIA as a destination or transit point for several
"extraordinary rendition flights" for suspected
terrorists--branding the island as yet another "legal
black hole" à la Guantánamo Bay, where neither the
British Human Rights Act nor
the
or the U.N. Convention against Torture apply.
The Pelindaba Treaty should mark the beginning of a
momentous new era in
cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear science and
technology through a new African Commission on Nuclear
Energy. But there is the possibility that the Diego
Garcia footnote could stand in the way of progress. If
Britain, the United States, and
this debate, then the entry into force of the Pelindaba
Treaty hasn't truly made
weapons after all.
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